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This study presents two separate competitiveness analyses to assess changes in, and 
factors influencing, the long-term competitiveness of a panel of commercial milk 
producers in East Griqualand (EG), South Africa. The Unit Cost Ratio (UCR) method was 
used to measure competitiveness of EG milk producers. It is defined as the ratio of dairy 
enterprise accounting costs plus an opportunity cost of management at 5% of milk revenue, 
to total dairy enterprise revenue. The initial UCR analysis was used to partly investigate 
the impact of dairy market deregulation on the relative competitiveness of EG milk 
producers over the period 1983 to 2006. The results of this UCR analysis found that the 
sample of EG milk producers were not competitive based on the net local price, PL, 
received for milk but were competitive when dairy cattle trading income was included. 
This suggests that dairy cattle trading income played an important role in enhancing the 
competitiveness of EG dairy enterprises in the study period. Further UCR analysis revealed 
that differences in the inherent ability of members of the EG group to manage market 
deregulation impacted on the relative competitiveness of EG milk producers. The top one-
third of the sample of EG milk producers remained relatively competitive from 1983 to 
2006 due to higher real milk prices and lower real unit costs than producers in the bottom 
one-third category. Differences in relative competitiveness between the top and bottom 
one-third categories of producers were statistically significant. 
 
Based on the findings of the UCR analysis, a Ridge regression analysis was then used to 
investigate other factors influencing the long-term competitiveness of selected milk 
producers from EG using unbalanced panel data for the period 1990 – 2006. Results of the 
regression analysis showed that dairy herd size, the level of farm debt, annual production 
per cow, technology and policy changes over time, and the ratio of trading income to total 
milk income influence the long-term competitiveness of these milk producers. To enhance 
their competitiveness in a deregulated dairy market, relatively small and profitable EG 
milk producers should consider increasing herd sizes as the importance of herd size in 
explaining competitiveness suggests that size economies exist. All EG milk producers 
should consider utilising more pasture and other forages to lower feed costs and select 
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Institutions play a crucial role in either enhancing or constraining the competitiveness of 
firms, sectors and industries within a nation’s economy (Porter, 2005:43). Dairy industries 
in many countries have traditionally been heavily regulated and protected by the state 
(Brunstad et al., 2001; Edwards, 2003), thus restricting competition within the industry, 
raising product prices to consumers and promoting an inefficient primary sector (Pasour, 
1990:18-19). Globally, due to increasing demand for milk and new dairy products, 
however, emphasis has shifted from government support policies to flexibility and 
innovation to improve the competitiveness of dairy industries (Suzuki and Kaiser, 2005; 
Blayney et al., 2006). Gopinath et al. (1996) argue that policies that promote productivity 
growth, such as public agricultural research and development, should be used in preference 
to policies that restrict competition to enhance the competitiveness of primary agriculture.  
 
According to Groenewald (2000), statutory intervention in South African (SA) agriculture, 
under the Marketing Act of 1937 (Act 27 of 1937), transferred wealth, through higher food 
prices, from consumers to agricultural producers. Evidence of these transfers in the SA 
dairy industry can be found in a study by McKenzie and Nieuwoudt (1985b) who 
estimated transfers in cost from consumers to milk producers over the period 1979/80 to 
1982/83 to be 12.7 to 17.1% of the value of fresh milk production, given an estimated 
own-price elasticity of demand for fresh milk of -0.51. Over the past 20 years the dairy 
industry in South Africa has undergone major structural change as the country has 
followed the global trend of liberalising the marketing of its agricultural products. 
Structural change in agriculture is characterised by changes in product characteristics, 
production and consumption patterns, size of operation and geographic distribution of 
producers (Boehlje, 1999). The SA dairy industry, previously regulated under the 
Marketing Acts of 1937 (Act 27 of 1937) and 1968 (Act 59 of 1968), was gradually 
deregulated; a process that was completed following the promulgation of the Marketing of 
Agricultural Products Act of 1996 (Act 47 of 1996) (Vink and Kirsten, 2000).  
 
One such structural change in the SA dairy industry is the consolidation effect experienced 
in the industry’s primary sector where declining milk producer numbers have been 







declined from 28 885 in 1983 (Collins, 1994:61) to 3 655 in 2008, while the average 
number of cows-in-milk per producer has risen from 88 in 1998 to 151 in 2008 (Coetzee 
and Maree, 2008). With dairy farm expansion and producer exits, however, has come some 
evidence of an improvement in the technical efficiency
1
 of South Africa’s primary dairy 
sector. Mkhabela et al. (2008) found evidence of this improvement in the KwaZulu-Natal 
(KZN) dairy industry where they showed that from 1999 to 2007, KZN dairy farms 
operated with greater levels of technical efficiency, with large farms showing greater gains 
in efficiency than small and medium farms. According to Kalaitzandonakes (1994), gains 
in technical efficiency are assumed to be brought about by improvements in the 
productivity of existing rather than new resources through improved management. 
Examples of improved management in milk production that increase technical efficiency 
include better husbandry, more meticulous record-keeping and closer supervision of hired 
labour. Some authors argue that dairy farm consolidation and reduced production costs are 
driven by other forces as well as institutional change, e.g. the benefits of size economies 
(Comrie, 1974:5; Doll and Orazem, 1984:217; El-Osta and Morehart, 2000) and 
technological advancement (Weersink and Tauer, 1991; Manchester and Blayney, 1997).  
 
Another structural change in the SA dairy industry is a change in the geographic 
distribution of milk production with a shift from inland to coastal areas (Coetzee and 
Maree, 2008). Blignaut (1999) contends that the impetus for this shift has been the 
popularisation of pasture-based milk production systems, which are more suited to coastal 
areas, and that lower collection costs per square-kilometre, due to less dispersion of milk 
producers, makes coastal areas more attractive to milk buyers2. Coastal areas (KZN, 
Western Cape and Eastern Cape) accounted for 52.4% and 68.2% of total milk production 
in South Africa in 1997 and 2007 respectively (Coetzee and Maree, 2008). 
 
Market liberalisation implies a redistribution of welfare between producers, consumers and 
taxpayers (Bouamra – Mechemache et al., 2002). Previous local research attributes 
structural changes in the number, size and distribution of SA milk producers to dairy 
market deregulation (Collins, 1994:58-60; National Agricultural Marketing Council 
                                               
1
 Technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of actual output to the maximum possible potential output from a 
given set of inputs and technology (Kalirajan and Shand, 1997). 
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(NAMC), 2001:31). More specifically, the deregulation process in the SA dairy industry 
was found to have contributed to increased cost pressure, reduced real producer milk prices 
(Collins, 1994:58-60), increased milk producer exit rates and loss of market share for milk 
producers (NAMC, 2001:31). Moreover, previous research suggests that the low 
profitability of milk production poses a significant barrier to entry for developing South 
Africa’s emerging milk producers (NAMC, 2001:9). The effects of institutional change at 
the firm or producer level may vary, however. El-Osta and Johnson (1998) suggest that 
milk producers with low production efficiency
3
 and those that are highly leveraged are 
particularly vulnerable to institutional change.  
 
Many authors note that the pace with which deregulation takes place, the stringency of 
regulatory policies being deregulated and the firm’s structural inertia are important when 
considering the firm-level effects of deregulation (Mahon and Murray, 1981; Cook et al., 
1983; Reger et al., 1992). Although deregulation of the SA dairy industry was completed 
following the abolition of the Marketing Act of 1968 (59 of 1968) in 1996, the 
deregulatory process, initiated in 1971, was characterised by gradual and incremental 
changes to legislation (Vink and Kirsten, 2000). This enabled milk producers and 
structures in supporting and related industries to adapt and respond to changes brought 
about by deregulation. International studies have found that market deregulation 
encourages innovation (Cantwell, 2005:544), entrepreneurship (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003), 
and increases in agricultural productivity (Doucouliagos and Hone, 2000; Blayney et al., 
2006). Sartorius von Bach and Van Zyl (1991) and Winston (1998) also suggest that 
deregulated firms are more flexible and, therefore, respond more rapidly to changes in their 
external environments. 
 
In a changing policy environment requiring adjustment to forces of supply and demand, 
milk producers can improve the financial position of their farm businesses by 
understanding the factors that influence profitability (Short, 2000). The perception amongst 
many SA milk producers is that changes brought about by dairy market deregulation have 
left them with comparatively less bargaining power in the marketplace and vulnerable to 
the threat of “cheap” imports (Phillips, 2007b; Bischoff, 2008; Broom, 2008). As 
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 Production efficiency is defined as the ratio of actual milk ouput to potential maximum milk output given a 







competitors in the global dairy market, SA milk producers need to re-position themselves 
and become more innovative and responsive to future changes to improve their 
competitiveness. It is critical, therefore, that factors which may enhance or restrict 
competitiveness of milk producers in the long-term are identified.  
 
An understanding of the concept of competitiveness is essential, not only to better 
understand the foundations upon which agricultural trade is based (Mosoma, 2004), but 
because competitiveness is a concept that, despite the widespread acceptance of its 
importance, is not well understood (Porter, 2005:43). Numerous authors recognise that the 
precise definition of competitiveness is ambiguous due to its multi-dimensional 
applications and interpretations. Some definitions focus on the underlying sources of 
competitiveness whilst others place more emphasis on the indicators of competitiveness 
(Ortmann, 2005; Esterhuizen, 2006:101; Siggel, 2006).  There is, however, consensus in 
the literature regarding the following features: competitiveness is a relative concept and 
relates to the profitable maintenance and/or gain of domestic and/or international market 
share by a firm, sector or industry (Kennedy et al., 1997; Ortmann, 2000; Esterhuizen, 
2006:90; Siggel, 2006).  
 
Using two separate competitiveness analyses, the objectives of this study are, firstly, to 
investigate the impact of dairy market deregulation on the competitiveness of commercial 
milk producers who comprise the East Griqualand (EG) study group in KwaZulu-Natal and 
the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa for the period 1983 to 2006. Secondly, based on 
the findings of the previous analysis, the study aims to use regression analysis to 
investigate the impact of other factors, such as production and financial factors, influencing 
the long-term competitiveness of a panel of EG milk producers for the period 1990 to 
2006.  
 
Study results are aimed, firstly, at addressing whether or not the perception by many SA 
milk producers that dairy market deregulation or market liberalisation impacted negatively 
on the profitability of their dairy enterprises has validity. Secondly, based on the study 
results, meaningful recommendations on how EG milk producers can improve the 
competitiveness of their dairy enterprises can also be provided. Study results and 
recommendations could be used by agricultural consultants advising milk producers, 







Marketing Council (NAMC) and the Department of Agriculture (DOA) to better 
understand the changes brought about by, and producer responses to, market deregulation 
and other institutional changes. It is also essential that policymakers are familiar with the 
determinants of long-term profitability and competitiveness at producer level so that 
appropriate support policies can, if needed, be developed to aid South Africa’s emerging 
milk producers.   
 
To achieve the study’s objectives it is imperative that an appropriate and unambiguous 
definition of competitiveness be adopted as this definition will guide the study’s research 
methodology. Based on a definition by Esterhuizen (2006:89), competitiveness in this 
study is defined as the ability of a milk producer to achieve sustainable business growth 
while earning at least the opportunity cost of management. A producer is, therefore, 
competitive if positive land rents (returns to land) are earned. To measure competitiveness 
at the producer level, this study uses a microeconomic indicator, the Unit Cost Ratio 
(UCR) developed by Siggel and Cockburn (1995). Since the UCR is a ratio of total 
enterprise costs to total enterprise revenue, it can also be considered as a measure of 
enterprise profitability. A microeconomic measure of competitiveness is used in preference 
to macroeconomic indicators because at the microeconomic level the concept of 
competitiveness focuses on the particular characteristics of each individual producer or 
firm competing directly for market share (Porter, 2005:43; Siggel, 2006).  
 
Previous studies have varied in their approaches to measuring the competitiveness or 
profitability for agricultural commodities at the producer level. Some studies have focused 
on production cost measures of competitiveness (Vink et al., 1998; Blignaut, 1999; Tauer, 
2001) whilst others have used profitability measures such as gross margin per litre (Hopps 
and Maher, 2007), Return on Assets (ROA) (Gloy et al., 2002) and Net Farm Income 
(NFI) (El-Osta and Johnson, 1998; Short, 2000). Previous research found a strong link 
between farm size (total numbers of cows), milking rate (production per cow) and dairy 
farm profitability (El-Osta and Johnson, 1998; Short, 2000; Gloy et al., 2002). Other 
factors that significantly affected profitability were forage and feed costs per cow (El-Osta 
and Johnson, 1998), milkings per day and debt-to-asset ratio (DA) (Gloy et al., 2002; 









Shortcomings of previous local research into the impact of deregulation on SA milk 
producers include, firstly, that the investigations were too broad and were analytical rather 
than empirical, and, secondly, many local and international investigations did not consider 
the effect of deregulation over time on the responses by milk producers. Previous research 
into the factors affecting competitiveness of milk producers have also not recognised the 
contribution of trading income to the profitability of the dairy enterprise. These issues will 
also be addressed in this study.  
 
This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1 presents the main literature review of 
this study and discusses changes in the SA dairy industry policy environment since the 
1920s. Structural changes, related to dairy market deregulation, with particular reference to 
consolidation of dairy farms and efficiency gains in the SA dairy industry are also 
discussed.  The study’s research methodology is presented in Chapter 2 and, in particular, 
this chapter addresses the need for an appropriate definition and measure of 
competitiveness. The first of two competitiveness analyses, the Unit Cost Ratio analysis of 
EG milk producers, is presented in Chapter 3. Based on the findings of the Unit Cost Ratio 
analysis, the second analysis is undertaken in Chapter 4, which considers other factors 
influencing the competitiveness of a panel of EG milk producers. This dissertation ends 
with conclusions, policy implications and suggested areas for further research. A summary 







CHAPTER 1  
SOUTH AFRICAN DAIRY INDUSTRY POLICY ENVIRONMENT: 1920 TO 




South African (SA) agriculture has, for most of its recent history, been purposefully 
influenced by the country’s prevailing statutory powers (Vink and Kirsten, 2000; Van Zyl 
et al., 2000). Statutory intervention in agriculture was implemented via various agricultural 
policy instruments and structures including measures promoting agricultural production, 
financing and marketing by the state (Brand, 1985). Gradually, South Africa has followed 
the global trend of liberalising the marketing of its agricultural commodities (NAMC, 
2001:12). This has had important implications for the competitiveness of agricultural 
producers who, post-deregulation, find themselves in a more competitive environment. The 
aim of this chapter is to contextualise policy and structural changes in the SA dairy 
industry by providing a rationale for statutory intervention in the industry, critically 
assessing previous legislation and discussing reasons for the structural changes in the SA 
dairy industry.  
 
1.2 Regulation in the SA dairy industry  
 
Vink and Kirsten (2000) note that prior to 1937, government involvement in SA 
agriculture was piecemeal and that the primary objective of government was to provide 
support, when required, to the agricultural sector. Similarly, in the United States (US), 
government programmes in agriculture were initially relatively small and seldom affected 
the individual producer over the period 1862 to 1933.  The role of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) over this period was primarily to increase agricultural 
productivity, provide extension and statistical services, and to maintain competitive 
agricultural markets (Pasour and Rucker, 2003:11).   
 
Extensive statutory intervention in the SA dairy industry began amid turbulent global 
economic conditions during the early 20
th
 century (de Swardt, 1983; Vink and Kirsten, 







malpractice and inefficiency during a period of economic depression in the early 1920’s 
(de Swardt, 1983).  In 1927 the SA government commissioned the Board of Trade and 
Industries (BTT) to conduct an investigation into these allegations. The BTT found that the 
conversion costs (milk to processed dairy products) were high, product quality was 
inconsistent and that competition was ruthless. De Swardt (1983) contends that free 
competition among market participants during this period adversely affected the country’s 
agricultural producers and that the trade of agricultural products was under the control of 
monopolised or cartelised traders. The bargaining power of agricultural producers under 
such conditions, he argued, was also weak.  
 
The findings and recommendations of the BTT had important implications for the SA dairy 
industry and SA agriculture as a whole, and ultimately led to the establishment of the Dairy 
Industry Control Board in 1930. The primary roles of the Board, as cited by Bonsma et al. 
(1972), de Swardt (1983), McKenzie (1984:8) and the NAMC (2001:23) were:  
 
i) The fixing of milk prices (industrial and fresh milk). 
ii) The establishment and implementation of an efficient and fair grading system 
with regular inspection. 
iii) The registration of all manufacturers. 
iv) To administer a small levy on butter and cheese, payable by every registered 
processor to fund the activities of the advisory board established to monitor the 
industry’s role-players. 
v) To co-ordinate the production, manufacture and marketing of all dairy products. 
vi) To promote the industry at all times.    
 
De Swardt (1983) noted that with the establishment of the Dairy Industry Control Board in 
1930, common ground was found between individuals with previously conflicting interests 
who, through collective action, could focus on improving industry efficiency, reducing 
costs, increasing producer incomes and competing favourably in export markets. The 
promulgation of the Marketing Act of 1937, subsequent to the Dairy Industry Control Act 
in 1930, advocated more direct and extensive statutory intervention in SA agriculture and 









Some of the powers of the Marketing Act of 1937, amended in 1968, included: 
 
i) Single channel marketing in which only the Board or its agents were legally 
entitled to buy, sell or store product. 
ii) The fixing of prices. 
iii) The introduction of pools and the transfer among pools. 
iv) Registration of traders and producers (this included the right to exclude or 
withdraw registration). 
v) The prohibition of the erection of mass storage facilities.  
vi) The fixation of transport tariffs. 
vii) The enforcement of marketing quotas.  
viii) Price discrimination. 
 
Brunstad et al. (2001) suggest that, although regulatory policies in dairy industries vary in 
scope between countries, two interventions are commonly used to raise producer incomes 
and to regulate the flow of milk. Firstly, most dairy industries utilise market price supports 
in conjunction with quota and surplus removal schemes. Secondly, price discrimination, in 
which the markets for fresh and industrial milk are separated, is used in conjunction with 
pooling arrangements to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth amongst the industry’s 
milk producers. The Marketing Acts of 1937 and 1968 aimed to stabilise the income of 
South Africa’s milk producers by regulating the flow of milk and by restricting perceived 
harmful competition between market participants (Groenewald, 2000). Richards (1936) 
accurately predicted that the passing of the Marketing Act of 1937 would distort 
agricultural production and have the following implications for agricultural markets in 
South Africa: (1) the proliferation of an agricultural monopoly; (2) increased production of 
unwanted agricultural products; (3) increased consumer prices; (4) a rise in producer living 
and production costs; and (5) heavy losses to the state. Indeed, previous research has found 
that statutory intervention in agriculture does distort agricultural production and often more 
intervention is needed to mitigate the adverse effects of previous government policies 
(Sandrey and Scobie, 1994).   
 
According to Pasour (1990:18-19), there are two competing hypotheses that explain the 







are often compared against the unattainable norm of a perfectly competitive4 market. 
Arguments citing the existence of monopolies, market instability, asymmetric information 
and negative externalities are, therefore, pervasive. Intervention in agricultural markets by 
the state is, therefore, justified on grounds of perceived market failure. Secondly, he argues 
that the impetus for intervention and control in agriculture by the state is best explained not 
on market stabilisation grounds but by the redistribution of wealth to rent-seeking groups 
who possess substantial political power. Pasour (1990:28-29) contends, however, that 
government programmes also compare unfavourably with perfectly competitive markets 
due to the creation of information problems (“because of the separation of power and 
knowledge”) and incentive problems (“due to the separation of power and responsibility”), 
restriction of competition, and rent-seeking activity. The relevant comparison, therefore, is 
between the functioning of real-world agricultural markets and the political process.  
 
Proponents of control continue to argue that several features, unique to milk production in 
conjunction with the structure of the milk market, necessitate statutory intervention in 
order to stabilise the industry and ensure orderly marketing (de Swardt, 1983; McKenzie 
and Nieuwoudt, 1985b; Brunstad et al., 2001). These unique features can be partitioned 
into milk production features and milk market features. 
 
1.3 Milk production features 
 
Seasonality of milk production: Generally, during South Africa’s mild spring and 
summer months the abundance of both natural and cultivated pasture in summer rainfall 
regions encourages milk producers to expand production whilst in winter, when pasture 
growth is constrained, milk production contracts. Thus, more use is made of purchased 
feeds (concentrates) and stored fodder during winter months in these regions (Buckle, 
1969:10). In winter rainfall regions such as the Western Cape milk is predominantly 
produced using Total Mixed Ration (TMR) production systems and, therefore, the seasonal 
effects on milk production are less pronounced (Bischoff, 2008). Associated with 
seasonality in milk production is the concept of biological lags exhibited by livestock in 
                                               
4
 To be defined as perfectly competitive, a market must satisfy four conditions: 1) there are many buyers and 
sellers, 2) the product is homogenous, 3) all resources are completely mobile, and 4) all buyers and sellers 







their breeding cycles and also by crop production cycles which affect feed supply (Tomek 
and Robinson, 2003:175). Milk producers make use of purchased and own-produced feeds, 
depending on relative prices and availability. The two sources are treated as substitutes in 
the short-run and complements in the long-run (Beyers and Hassan, 2000).  
 
The seasonal nature of milk production can lead to the generation of larger than anticipated 
supplies (“surpluses”) and lower than anticipated supplies (“shortages”) of fresh milk and 
other dairy products, resulting in a fluctuating producer price due to the price-inelastic 
nature of supply and demand for milk (de Swardt, 1983; NAMC, 2001:24; Tomek and 
Robinson, 2003:175; Suzuki and Kaiser, 2005). Therefore, to prevent substantial price 
fluctuations, proponents of control argue that statutory intervention is needed to regulate 
the flow of milk. 
  
Short-run fixity of resources: Commercial milk production is highly capital intensive and 
requires use of specialised production inputs (Comrie, 1974:5; Bragg and Dalton, 2004). 
Milk is also harvested daily and is highly perishable, locking the producer into a choice of 
selling, processing or dumping the milk. This makes adjustment to changes in milk and 
input prices difficult as in the short-run, resources used in the production of milk (e.g., 
number of cows, type of feed, milking equipment) are fixed (Suzuki and Kaiser, 2005). 
This increases the risk borne by the milk producer in producing milk and, therefore, 
producers may feel government support is necessary as an aid to managing price risk in the 
short-run. 
 
Rent-seeking behaviour by producer groups: Pasour and Rucker (2003:49) suggest that 
statutory intervention in agriculture is better explained by rent-seeking behaviour on the 
part of agricultural producers rather than market failure or inefficiency. Kassier et al. 
(1992) note that the political power and collective action of SA commercial agricultural 
producers ensured the passing of the controversial Marketing Act of 1937; an Act rejected 
by parliament the previous year. Therefore, through collective action, milk producers can 
increase their bargaining power relative to other market participants and may successfully 










1.4 Milk market features 
 
Price-inelastic demand for fresh milk: Fresh milk is traditionally considered a basic 
necessity implying a price-inelastic demand (McKenzie and Nieuwoudt, 1985b). Evidence 
of this is provided in Table 1.1 which presents the findings of previous research on the 
price elasticity of demand for and supply of milk. Dahlgran (1980) estimated price 
elasticities of demand and supply for 16 US states and found that while the price elasticity 
of demand was highly inelastic, the supply elasticity was elastic over the period 1968 to 
1977. Dahlgran’s (1980) relatively high estimate of supply elasticity could be due to the 
use of monthly rather than annual time series data and/or bias resulting from the use of 
only positive supply elasticity estimates in calculating the aggregate supply elasticity. 
Huang (1996) estimated the price elasticity of demand for milk at the retail level in the US 
as highly inelastic with an estimate of 0.04. 
 
Table 1.1 Farm and retail level price elasticity of demand and supply estimates for 
fresh milk 
Region Author Time Period Demand 
elasticity 
Supply elasticity 
USA Ippolito and Masson (1978) - -0.12 to -0.34 0.40 to 0.90 




 Huang (1996) 1989-93 0.04
b 
- 
Canada Zuhair and Sahi (1976) 1958-72 0.04
b 
- 










a. This is an aggregate of 16 US states. 
b. Retail level 
c. Industrial milk only. 
 
In South Africa, McKenzie and Nieuwoudt (1985b) estimated the own-price elasticity of 
demand for fresh milk as -0.78 at the retail level and -0.51 to -0.65 at the farm level over 
the period 1950/51 to 1980/81. Although they could not obtain an estimate of the price 
elasticity of supply for fresh milk, they estimated the price elasticity of supply for 
industrial milk as 0.55. They expect fresh milk supply to be more price-inelastic, relative to 








Due to the price-inelastic nature of demand for fresh milk, proponents of control argue that 
price fluctuations (volatility) in an unregulated dairy market would be large and the 
resulting risk would cause a backward shift in the supply function, reducing both consumer 
and producer surplus (Dahlgran, 1980; de Swardt, 1983; McKenzie and Nieuwoudt, 
1985a). Christ (1980) argues further that since dairy farming involves substantial 
investment in facilities and equipment (sunk capital), adjustments to supply (due to price 
changes) are achieved by forgoing some sunk capital to the detriment of the milk producer.    
 
Oligopsonistic market structure: Due to the perishable nature of milk, its frequency of 
harvest and the distance from market, milk producers were, in the past, left with few 
alternative buyers for their milk (Suzuki and Kaiser, 2005). This oligopsonistic (few large 
buyers, many small sellers) market structure meant milk producers had reduced bargaining 
power in the market and could often not negotiate more favourable prices.  In the SA 
market, the power of producer co-operatives exacerbated the problem of oligopsony in 
agricultural commodity markets (Groenewald, 2000).  
 
Protectionist policies: Differences in international competitiveness between countries for 
dairy products, due to differences in the levels of statutory intervention, necessitate the 
implementation of import quotas and/or tariffs to protect against dumping and “cheap” 
imports (Suzuki and Kaiser, 2005). The protection of domestic milk production is often 
justified by proponents of control on the basis of ensuring national food security and self-
sufficiency in food production (de Swardt, 1983; Brand, 1985). 
 
Brunstad et al. (2001) note that the regulation of dairy industries may have been applicable 
in the context of relatively poor economic conditions globally during the early 20
th
 century, 
but due to structural and technological changes over time, the justifications for retaining 
these sanctions in dairy industries are tenuous. Substantiating this statement, they contend 
that the bargaining power of milk producers has increased over time (relative to other 
market participants) through advancements in distribution networks and milk conservation 
methods. Furthermore, price stabilization can no longer be justified as farm-level 
production has become more predictable. The effects of regulation on SA agriculture and 









1.5 Adverse effects of regulation on SA agriculture 
 
According to de Swardt (1983), statutory intervention in the SA agricultural sector was 
primarily aimed at improving the efficiency of production and the industry’s market 
supply, stabilizing domestic production and consumption and protecting domestic 
producers from foreign competitors. Brand (1985) notes, however, that various policy aims 
can often come into conflict with, rather than complement, one another. For example, he 
suggests that increasing a country’s food production to achieve self-sufficiency may not 
necessarily ensure acceptable net farm incomes if higher producer incomes are offset by 
higher production costs through higher derived demand for inputs. Furthermore, it is 
difficult for policymakers to identify, implement and manage valid policy aims and assign 
acceptable weights to those aims as these factors depend crucially upon the point of view 
of consideration.  
 
As to whether the Marketing Act of 1937 achieved its intended aims in SA agriculture, 
Groenewald (1992; cited by Kassier et al., 1992) suggests that the Act achieved few, if 
any, of its initial objectives. Firstly, the goal of efficient production, measured by 
productivity indexes, showed that only a small increase over a period of 30 years had been 
achieved. Secondly, the goal of stabilising producer prices was achieved to an extent but 
income stabilisation was not. Thirdly, the goal of providing fair and equal access to as 
many producers as possible was not achieved due to discriminatory legislation as well as a 
bias towards large-scale agriculture. Lastly, the goal of promoting demand and 
consumption was not as successful as originally anticipated.   
 
1.6 Adverse effects of regulation in the SA dairy industry  
 
1.6.1 Higher consumer prices and surplus milk production 
 
Mahon and Murray (1981) and Pasour (1990:147) suggest that regulations implemented to 
limit excessive competition among firms directly impact on the competitive dynamics of 
the industry as individual producers and consumers no longer have the right to engage in 
mutually beneficial exchange. In the case of the SA dairy industry, competition among 
market participants was restricted by the state and SA milk producers were obliged to 







marketing arrangement. In 1977 two dairy firms controlled approximately 70% of the total 
industry turnover (Groenewald, 2000) and the SA dairy industry, therefore, was 
characterised by an oligopsonistic (few, large milk buyers and many, small producers) 
market structure. Groenewald (2000) argues that under such a marketing arrangement 
(statutory monopoly), little or no competitive pressures to enforce improved performance 
and efficiency exist. He concluded that the economic concentration in the SA dairy and 
other industries caused by the Marketing Act of 1937 contributed substantially to high 
marketing margins of food in South Africa.    
 
In the SA dairy industry price discrimination was, according to proponents of control, 
primarily aimed at stabilizing milk production and regulating the flow of milk (de Swardt, 
1983). Pasour and Rucker (2003:126) contend, however, that the rationale for 
implementing price discrimination in the US dairy sector was also to raise the incomes of 
milk producers. McKenzie and Nieuwoudt (1985b) found that price discrimination, under 
the Fresh Milk Scheme, increased prices paid by SA consumers for fresh milk over the 
period 1979/80 to 1982/83. This resulted in a decline in consumption by 8.0 to 10.7%. 
Increased producer prices resulted in an increase in supply of milk by 2.3 to 4.5%, 
resulting in surplus production. They also estimate that income transfers from consumers 
to producers and the then Dairy Board are large, ranging from 12.7% to 17.1% of the value 
of fresh milk consumption. Less than half of these transfers (48%) were received by 
producers. McKenzie and Nieuwoudt (1985b) also estimated that in a perfectly competitive 
market, social costs would have been substantially lower. They estimated that consumer 
prices for fresh milk would have been 14.3 to 19.4% lower, producer milk prices would 
have been 5.2 to 10.8% lower, fresh milk production would have been 2.3 to 4.5% lower 
and fresh milk consumption would have been 8.0 to 10.3% higher.  
 
1.6.2 Protection and support of inefficient producers  
  
Studies by Kalaitzandonakes (1994), Ahmad and Bravo-Ureta (1995) and Richards and 
Jeffery (1997) suggest that government regulation in agriculture (such as price supports) 







Ureta (1995) found that productivity growth5 in the US dairy industry was hindered by 
protection policies and that productivity growth was primarily fuelled by technological 
progress rather than technical efficiency. In South Africa price discrimination policies 
under the Marketing Act of 1968 led to large inefficiencies in the production of milk and 
other agricultural commodities (Groenewald, 2000).  
 
The problem of inefficiency (producing at a relatively high cost) was particularly prevalent 
in producers of industrial milk (Bonsma et al., 1972). South African milk producers were 
classified as either industrial or fresh milk producers depending on the particular market 
they supplied
6
. Milk producers supplying fresh milk received the industrial milk price if 
they produced in excess of their quota allowance or during periods of higher than 
anticipated production if the producer operated under a pooling arrangement. The price of 
fresh milk commanded a price premium relative to industrial milk up to as much as 140c 
per 100 pounds of milk in 1972. This meant that the production of industrial milk was 
often not competitive relative to other agricultural enterprises such as crops and, hence, 
received less of the industrial milk producer’s management time (Bonsma et al., 1972). 
Industrial milk producers were also paid an average price for their milk (regardless of its 
quality) and, therefore, had little economic incentive to invest in improvements to milking 
equipment and facilities. A low capital outlay, low expenditures and the seasonal 
availability of feed, however, meant that many small, industrial milk producers were able 
to remain in the industry despite producing milk of questionable quality (Bonsma et al., 
1972).   
 
McKenzie and Nieuwoudt (1985b) note that quotas for milk, applied predominantly in 
Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal), protected the higher marginal cost producer from declining 
pool prices, therefore proliferating inefficiency of the primary sector in the dairy industry. 
Furthermore, Richards and Jeffrey (1997) suggest that quotas for milk may cause 
producers to retain animals that would, in an undistorted market, be replaced by higher 
producing animals. This reduces the rate of technical change or genetic progress of the 
herd causing lower rates of productivity growth. This problem is particularly prevalent in 
                                               
5
 Productivity growth consists of growth in technical change and technical efficiency (Ahmad and Bravo-
Ureta, 1995). 
6
 Proximity to a major centre was a major determinant of whether a producer marketed product as fresh or 







the Alberta dairy industry in Canada, they argued, and marketing schemes led to a loss in 
competitiveness to countries whose dairy industries operate without regulation (Richards 
and Jeffery, 1997).       
 
1.7 Market deregulation of SA agriculture 
 
1.7.1 Macroeconomic policy reforms  
 
Vink and Kirsten (2000) note that the argument for a free market system rests on the basis 
that agricultural producers should be rewarded in proportion to their contribution to the 
national economy without interference with the forces of supply and demand by the state. 
According to Sandrey and Vink (2006), the deregulation of South Africa’s agricultural 
markets began outside the agricultural sector during the late 1970’s with extensive 
liberalisation of the country’s financial sector.  Policy reforms during this period resulted 
in fluctuations in the country’s currency value and interest rates.  
 
During the 1980’s the Rand continued to devalue and farm input prices (which consist of a 
large import component) rose faster than output prices. Part of the reforms to the financial 
sector was an amendment to the reserve requirements of the banking sector which made it 
impossible for the Land Bank to continue subsidising lending rates to agricultural 
producers. The net effect was that, during the 1980s, interest payments rapidly became the 
largest cost component in agricultural production (Vink and Kirsten, 2000). During this 
period of policy reform, however, agricultural producers faced difficult and unpredictable 
climatic conditions forcing many agricultural producers to leave the sector (Sandrey and 
Vink, 2006).   
 
1.7.2 Market deregulation of the SA dairy industry 
 
Deregulatory changes in the SA dairy industry are summarised in Table 1.2. According to 
the NAMC (2001:19), deregulation of the dairy industry began in 1971 with the 
amendment of legislation allowing the colouring of margarine from white to yellow with 
the result that margarine became a closer substitute for butter. The amendment led to a 
70% drop in butter sales from 1971-1979. From 1979 the deregulation process began to 







of 1968) and the promulgation of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 (Act 
47 of 1996). Many of the policy reforms during the deregulatory process in the SA dairy 
industry were made to pricing institutions; for example, the abolition of retail price 
controls for fresh milk, cheese and butter in 1983 and 1985 respectively.  
 
Table 1.2: Summary of deregulatory measures implemented in the SA dairy industry, 
1971 - 1998 
Year Deregulatory measure 
1971 Margarine allowed to be coloured yellow. 
1983 Control over fresh milk prices at retail level abolished 
Registration of fresh milk distributors abolished 
1985 Retail price control over cheese and butter abolished. 
1987 
 
Uniform hygiene standards set. Applied to fresh and industrial milk producers. 
Dairy Industry Control Act repealed. 
1988 Floor price scheme for fresh milk implemented. 
1993 Dairy Board closed and surplus removal scheme abolished. 
1994 Quantitative import controls replaced by import tariffs. 
1996 Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 (No 47 of 1996) is promulgated. 
1998 Milk Board is closed. Producer marketing boards, including Milk Board, phased out over 12 
months.  
Source: NAMC (2001:23) 
 
Restrictive registration for the right to distribute fresh milk was abolished in 1983, leading 
to a ten-fold increase in the number of fresh milk distributors between 1983 and 1994 
(Collins, 1994:86). The objectives of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 
(Act 47 of 1996) were aimed at enhancing the international competitiveness of SA 
agriculture via trade reform from an import substitution to an export orientated policy 
(Vink and Kirsten, 2000). The new Act aimed to: 1) increase market access for all market 
participants, 2) promote efficiency of the marketing of agricultural products, 3) optimise 
export earnings from agricultural products, and 4) enhance the viability of the agricultural 
sector (van Zyl et al., 2000) Other stipulations in the Act were the phasing out of producer 
dominated Control Boards by 1 January 1997, bringing to an end significant producer 
support policies in the SA agricultural sector. The following section discusses the findings 
of previous research into the effects of SA dairy market deregulation on the industry’s 








1.8 Effects of dairy market deregulation on the primary sector of the SA dairy 
industry: evidence from previous research 
 
According to Winston (1998), market deregulation takes time to be effectively 
implemented due primarily to the time taken by policymakers to dismantle regulatory 
structures and the time taken by market participants to adjust to their new competitive 
environment. After conducting an investigation into the effects of market deregulation on 
the SA dairy industry, the NAMC (2001:3-4) found that the deregulatory process 
proceeded too rapidly, was too extensive and benefited the economies of developed 
countries, whose dairy industries were heavily subsidised, through increased dairy exports 
to South Africa.  
 
Vink and Kirsten (2000) contend that the deregulation process in SA agriculture was 
characterised by gradual and incremental reforms to policy. When the deregulation process 
progresses gradually, firms have time to respond to impending changes and are, therefore, 
better off than if the deregulatory changes were abrupt (Reger et al., 1992). Furthermore, 
Vink and Kirsten (2000) suggest that the incremental policy reforms over time afforded 
entrepreneurs in supporting and related markets to adapt and develop institutions to aid 
producers in managing risk. Over time, therefore, as dairy market deregulation proceeded, 
milk producers remaining in the industry would be able to adjust more rapidly to price 
changes. 
 
A shortcoming of previous investigations into the impact of dairy market deregulation on 
the SA dairy industry is that these investigations were not sufficiently detailed and applied 
to the entire dairy value chain (producers through to consumers). Previous investigations 
were also not empirical and, therefore, the effects of dairy market deregulation on a 
particular sector of the SA dairy industry has not been adequately addressed.  Previous 
investigations also omit the effect of market deregulation over the long-term and responses 
to market deregulation by the primary sector. The following section discusses several key 
findings from previous local studies on the impact of dairy market deregulation on SA milk 










1.8.1 Price formation and the marketing arrangements for fresh milk in the dairy industry  
 
Subsequent to the abolition of the Marketing Act of 1968, SA farmers were no longer 
obliged to market their product through a single channel, i.e. Marketing Boards or their 
agents. Agricultural co-operatives, reliant on the guarantee of sales via Marketing Boards, 
found the competitive environment they operated in severely altered following trade policy 
reform in 1994; these co-operatives now faced competition from producers and 
multinational companies entering the SA market (D’Haese and Bostyn, 2001). Many SA 
agricultural co-operatives (including a major dairy co-operative) responded to these 
challenges by converting their organisations to private companies.  
 
Milk producers are now paid on the basis of the compositional and hygienic quality of 
milk, volume of milk produced and proximity to the milk buyer’s depot in a comparative 
base-pricing purchasing system administered by milk buyers. Price premiums are also 
administered on the basis of volume and/or seasonal adjustment criteria (NAMC, 2001:36). 
In South Africa’s deregulated dairy market it is now the responsibility of individual milk 
buyers rather than statutory Control Boards to balance milk supply during times of lower 
or higher than anticipated supplies. The NAMC (2001:37) notes that whereas large milk 
buyers have the capital reserves and facilities to process and store surplus product in times 
of overproduction, small and medium milk buyers do not. The NAMC (2001:37) concludes 
that this has a destabilising effect on producer and, hence, consumer prices during periods 
of higher than anticipated supplies as small and medium milk buyers tend to sell their 
product at reduced prices to downstream market participants (such as wholesalers and 
retailers). 
 
Price determination in the dairy industry is contentious due to differences in milk quality, 
proximity of milk producers to markets and production capacity which impact on the 
product price received by the producer. An example of the price calculation for a typical 
milk producer supplying a large milk buyer is provided in Appendix A. Subsequent to 
dairy market deregulation, the SA dairy industry’s oligopsonistic market structure has 
persisted. Major milk buyers still had 75% of the market share in 1994 (Collins, 1994:86) 
and 8.5% of milk buyers purchased and controlled 91% of total production in 1997 
(AGROCON, 1997:M13). The perception amongst SA milk producers is, therefore, that 







of their dairy enterprises in a deregulated dairy market due to them having less control over 
product prices they receive (Phillips, 2007b).  
 
One way in which a firm can gain more control over its product prices is to integrate 
forward into the supply chain to gain better access to end users and better market visibility 
(Thompson et al., 2007:173). An example of this can be found in the KZN dairy industry 
where 34 milk producers collectively market milk under the Midlands Milk brand. In 2008, 
Midlands Milk processed approximately 230 000 litres per day and supplied numerous, 
larger milk buyers with unprocessed milk. Producers supplying Midlands Milk are paid on 
a milk quality and quantity basis but the cost structure of producers is also taken into 
account (Joubert, 2008). This payment arrangement, which also considers the producer’s 
production cost structure, may, however, promote inefficient (high cost per litre) milk 
production as milk producers may not have a sufficient economic incentive to produce at a 
lower cost per litre.   
 
1.8.2 Reduced real producer milk prices  
 
International studies on the US banking and trucking sectors have found strong evidence 
that deregulation or market liberalisation caused lower real (operator, in the case of the 
trucking sector) prices due to the rents from statutory support no longer being realised 
(Winston, 1998; Nickerson and Silverman, 2003; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). The 
implementation of uniform and minimum milk pricing legislation in 1988 enabled SA 
producers to negotiate with milk buyers on the price for milk (Collins, 1994:58). However, 
due to the oligopsonistic (few large buyers, many small sellers) structure of the dairy 
market created by previous regulation of the industry, individual producers had low 
bargaining power relative to milk buyers and were, therefore, often unable to negotiate for 
more favourable prices. Geographic constraints, limiting the milk buyer alternatives 
available to producers, further reduced producer bargaining power. Minimum pricing 
legislation also acted as a stimulus to production and the removal of surplus product was 
funded indirectly by milk producers through higher levies paid to milk buyers (Collins, 
1994:58-60). The impact on national producer milk price can be seen in Figure 1.1 overleaf 
where the real national producer milk price (2000=100) declined from R2.00/litre in 
1983/84 to a low of R1.22/litre in 1999/00. The real average national producer milk price 







Although minimum pricing legislation gave milk producers relative security against price 
fluctuations it also hindered a competitive pricing strategy for fresh milk. Milk producers 
were unable to price aggressively at levels below the minimum price set by the Dairy 
Board or its agents and, therefore, could not compete effectively against substitute products 
(Collins, 1994:59). Substitute products for fresh milk and other dairy products, such as 
non-dairy blends, whiteners and yellow margarine have been more price flexible and have 
eroded per capita consumption of fresh milk and dairy products over time. This has 
ultimately eroded milk producer revenue (McKenzie and Nieuwoudt, 1985a).  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Real producer milk price trends, South Africa, 1983/84-2006/07 
(2000=100) 
                        Source: National Department of Agriculture (NDA) (2008)   
 
According to the NAMC (2001:49), the demise of the Dairy Board, which led to the 
cessation of a successful dairy educational programme (promoting the health benefits of 
fresh milk), has contributed to lower per capita consumption of fresh milk since 1993. 
Reduced profit margins in milk production, following market deregulation, can act as a 
significant barrier to entry for South Africa’s emerging milk producers (NAMC, 2001:6) 







that, although reduced profit margins may affect the attractiveness of dairy farming, 
adequate capital and technical skills are essential to ensuring success in dairy farming. 
These factors and reduced profit margins can act as a barrier for emerging milk producers 
to enter the industry. 
 
1.8.3 Loss of market share for fresh milk and other dairy products  
 
According to AGROCON (1989:G7), the market share for substitute products such as non-
dairy blends and whiteners increased roughly 2% from 1984/85 to 1987/88 while the 
market share for butter declined by 1% over the same period. The objectives of the 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 (Act 47 of 1996) were broadly aimed at 
enhancing the international competitiveness of SA agriculture via trade reform from an 
import substitution to an export orientated policy (Vink and Kirsten, 2000). The reform of 
South Africa’s trade regime from quantitative to tariff control led to increased importation 
of dairy products from 1994, resulting in a significant loss in market share for SA milk 
producers and processors. Increased imports are a result of South Africa’s relatively low 
import tariff rates for dairy products (among the lowest in the world) and several loopholes 
in the tariff structure, exploited by importers of dairy products in the late 1990’s 
(AGROCON, 1997:M15). Figure 1.2 illustrates the trend in the importation of fresh milk 
and dairy products, taken as five-year averages, from 1983 to 2005.   
 
The estimated loss in income to the dairy industry since trade policy reform was estimated 
at approximately R190 million in 2001. This represents a direct negative impact of 
10c/litre on the producer milk price (NAMC, 2001:26). Further downward pressure was 
put on producer milk prices with the ‘dumping’
7
 of Irish cheese products in 2004. 
According to Bieldt (2004), the resulting decline in demand for locally manufactured dairy 
products caused an estimated 15c/litre decrease in the milk producer price between 2004 
and 2005. 
 
                                               
7
 Dumping is said to occur if an exported product is sold in a foreign market at a lower price than is charged 








Figure 1.2 Imports of milk and other dairy products, South Africa, 1983 – 2005 
                       Source: FAOSTAT (2008) 
 
A contributing factor to the increase in imports of dairy products into South Africa was the 
overstatement of Minimum Market Access (MMA) commitments (AGROCON, 
1997:M14; NAMC, 2001:30). MMA commitments are for products where little or no 
imports took place in the past. South Africa agreed to meet MMA quota commitments 
equal to 3% of the domestic consumption of dairy products in the base period (1986-1988). 
Imports were, however, calculated on 3% of the total South African Customs Union 
(SACU) consumption which included other southern African countries. The resulting 
overstatement in import quota led to increased imports of dairy products and an estimated 
10% loss of market share for SA’s milk producers and processors to international 
competitors (NAMC, 2001:30).  
 
1.8.4 Expansion and consolidation of SA dairy farms  
 
Numerous authors suggest that, given the unique marketing and production features of 
milk (discussed in sections 1.3 and 1.4), in an unregulated market characterised by volatile 







were regulated) and fewer milk producers would engage in milk production (Christ, 1980).  
The period 1983 – 1987 in the SA dairy industry was characterised by numerous 
amendments to pricing, registration and hygiene legislation as the deregulatory process 
began to gather momentum. Collins (1994:61) argues that these amendments led to 
increased uncertainty within the dairy industry, contributing significantly to higher 
producer exit rates. The reduced profitability of milk production, through declining real 
producer prices over time, has also been suggested as a possible cause of the increased 
producer exit rates from the industry (NAMC, 2001:30).  Figure 1.3 shows the trends in 
commercial milk producer numbers and milk production per producer for South Africa 
from 1983 to 2004.  
 
As Figure 1.3 illustrates, the declining trend in the number of commercial milk producers 
has been accompanied by an increase in the total annual production per producer over the 
period 1983 to 2004. South Africa’s milk producer numbers have continued to decline 
from 28885 in 1983 to 3655 in 2008, while the average number of cows-in-milk per 
producer has risen from 88 in 1998 to 151 in 2008 (Coetzee and Maree, 2008). Milk 
production per producer has increased from 70175 litres per annum in 1983 to 583315 
litres per annum in 2004 (NDA, 2008).  
 
The shift from small, owner-operator dairy farms to fewer, larger, more sophisticated 
enterprises over time is a distinctive feature of dairy industries in regions and countries 
such as the US (Matulich, 1978; Bragg and Dalton, 2004), Korea (Kim, 1999), and the 
European Union  (EU) (Dawson and Hubbard, 1987; Hopps and Maher, 2007). The US 
dairy sector has seen an increase in dairy farm consolidation since the 1970’s (Matulich, 
1978; Weersink and Tauer, 1991). 
 
Matulich (1978) found that for US dairy farms in California, economies of size existed 
from 375 to 1200 cows-in-milk and that the long-run average cost (LAC) curve was L-
shaped. Moreover, Matulich (1978) found discontinuities in the various herd size 
categories that were identified. He attributes these discontinuities to differences between 
milk producers with regard to milking technique, housing configuration and labour 
complement. For example, the LAC curve for a herd size of 450 cows-in-milk may lie 









Figure 1.3 Number of commercial milk producers and annual milk production per 
producer, South Africa, 1983 - 20048               
                       Source: Collins (1994:61); Maree (2007); NDA (2008)  
 
Between 1950 and 1982 the number of registered milk producers in England and Wales 
fell from 162000 to 43000 while the average herd size increased four-fold to 65 cows-in-
milk (Dawson and Hubbard, 1987). Investigating the existence of size economies in the 
England and Wales dairy sector, Dawson and Hubbard (1987) found that the LAC curve 
for a sample of 405 milk producers was U-shaped (rather than L-shaped) but that the 
precise shape of the curve depended upon a milk producer’s managerial ability. They 
reported that economies of size existed up to 127 cows-in-milk (given average managerial 
ability) before diseconomies were found, but that these diseconomies were small and 
profits could still be made above the threshold level of 127 cows-in-milk.      
 
In the European Union (EU) dairy farmer exit rates have typically been 4-5% per annum. 
Since 2000, Northern Ireland’s producer numbers have declined by 7000 whereas over the 
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same period, the average quota size per producer has increased to 50 000 litres per annum 
(Hopps and Maher, 2007). Bragg and Dalton (2004) point out that, although low real milk 
prices paid to producers have been suggested to be the primary reason influencing a milk 
producer’s decision to exit dairy farming in the US, age of the milk producer, higher off-
farm income opportunities, lower returns and greater diversification of farm income are 
other important factors.  
 
Several reasons, as well as institutional change, have been postulated for the consolidation 
of dairy farms. Huang (1973) suggests that a country’s farm sizes are initially determined 
by that country’s resource endowments, but with development, such as increases in off-
farm employment, technology changes and changes in factor proportions, pressure to 
expand farm sizes increases. Comrie (1974:5) maintains that milk producers are faced with 
an economic problem, inherent in milk production, which forces milk producers to expand 
production capacity. This economic problem, he suggests, is the result of a large capital 
outlay on milking equipment, parlours and cattle which results in a producer’s fixed costs 
per litre of milk being high. The milk producer, therefore, has an economic incentive to 
expand production capacity to capture the benefits of size economies.  
 
Current size of the dairy enterprise plays an important role in influencing the decision to 
either expand the enterprise or exit the industry during periods of low or declining real 
producer prices. During periods of declining or low real producer prices small firms are 
under greater pressure to expand than larger firms and smaller enterprises may, therefore, 
not survive (Doll and Orazem, 1984:217). This is because expansion in farm size may 
require substantial investments in equipment and facilities which cannot be justified on 
small farms as the cost advantages can only be achieved by expanding output. Accounting 
for dairy enterprise expansion, Chavas and Klemme (1986) and Adelaja (1991) suggest 
that in the short-run supply response by milk producers is brought about through an 
increase in productivity per cow, whereas in the long-run the response by milk producers is 
to increase production capacity by increasing herd size. El-Osta and Johnson (1998) 
identify factors such as specialization in milk production, economies of size, tax 










1.8.5 Efficiency gains as a result of deregulation 
 
Doll and Orazem (1984:217) note that expansion of agricultural output usually increases 
efficiency, lowering a producer’s average unit costs. Collins (1994:64) suggests that the 
increasing cost pressure incurred by milk producers and the declining producer’s share of 
the consumer’s Rand over time, has necessitated greater efficiency (producing at a lower 
cost per litre) and better management on the part of SA milk producers to ensure financial 
survival. According to Doll and Orazem (1984:195), a producer is able to change the size 
of the farm business in the long run and will implement changes that enhance the 
efficiency of the farming operation and enable financial and production goals to be more 
readily achieved.  
 
Various authors have found that an institutional change, such as market deregulation, 
results in consolidation and an improvement in the efficiency of firms within an industry 
(Kalaitzandonakes, 1994; Nickerson and Silverman, 2003; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). 
Accounting for firm consolidation in an industry following an institutional change, 
Nickerson and Silverman (2003) note that deregulation is an ‘external shock’ to a firm’s 
environment. Further, they argue that if the primary goal of a firm is to achieve 
profitability and/or survive, poorly performing firms are compelled to respond to changes 
in their external environments by initiating actions to remedy that poor performance. If 
poor performance persists a firm either exits an industry or merges with other firms.  
 
There is some evidence that accompanying the consolidation of SA dairy farms over the 
period of market deregulation has been an improvement in the technical efficiency of the 
primary sector. Mkhabela et al. (2008) found evidence of this improvement on dairy farms 
in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) where they showed that from 1999 to 2007, these farms gained 
in technical efficiency, with large farms showing greater gains than small and medium 
farms. Kalaitzandonakes (1994) suggests that gains in technical efficiency typically result 
from an improvement in the productivity of existing rather than new resources through 
improved management practices. Therefore, gains in technical efficiency can be brought 
about by increasing managerial input into the dairy enterprise. Superior husbandry 
practices, more meticulous record-keeping systems and closer supervision of hired labour 







findings of Mkhabela et al. (2008) indicated increasing returns to scale on KZN dairy 
farms, they could not explain the reasons why these farms were expanding.  
 
Deregulation alters the competitive environment that firms operate in (Stiroh and Strahan, 
2003; David Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006). As discussed in section 1.2.3, regulation 
and statutory intervention in the SA dairy industry led to the protection of mainly small, 
inefficient milk producers. Following deregulation, these inefficient producers were 
exposed. The net effect of an institutional change such as dairy market deregulation may 
be, therefore, the consolidation of, and an improvement in, the technical efficiency of SA 
dairy farms.      
 
Another reason for the increased rate of dairy farm expansion and improvements in 
efficiency over time is technological change (Matulich, 1978; Weersink and Tauer, 1991). 
Investigating the direction of causality between dairy herd (farm) size and productivity in 
the US dairy sector, Weersink and Tauer (1991) found that the direction of causality is 
from dairy herd size to increased productivity but both factors are influenced by price 
changes. They found that milk producers in the US dairy sector expanded production 
capacity (herd size) in response to price changes and were, therefore, in a better position to 
adopt new technologies and become more productive. Similarly, based on evidence 
presented in Figure 1.3, SA milk producers may have responded to declining real producer 
prices during the deregulatory process by expanding production capacities and adopting 
new technologies.      
 
1.8.6 Changes in geographic distribution of milk production 
 
Another structural change that is occurring in the SA dairy industry is a change in the 
geographic distribution of milk production with a shift from inland to coastal areas 
(Coetzee and Maree, 2008). As Table 1.3 illustrates, the dominant milk producing regions 
have shifted from the interior of the country to the higher rainfall, coastal regions such as 
the Western and Eastern Cape provinces and KwaZulu-Natal (Blignaut, 1999; Coetzee and 
Maree, 2008). Blignaut (1999) contends that the impetus for this shift has been the 
popularisation of pasture-based production systems, which are more suited to coastal areas. 
Lower collection costs per square-kilometre, due to less dispersion of milk producers, also 







milk producers in coastal areas may also have input cost advantages relative to inland 
producers due to their close proximity to sea ports. McKenzie and Nieuwoudt (1985a) note 
that high producer milk prices encourage intensive feeding milk production systems such 
as Total Mixed Ration (TMR) systems. The removal of price supports for milk producers 
resulting in lower real milk prices, therefore, may have promoted the adoption of low-
input, pasture-based milk production systems. Coastal areas (KZN, Western Cape and 
Eastern Cape) accounted for 52.4% and 68.2% of total milk production in South Africa in 
1997 and 2007 respectively (Coetzee and Maree, 2008).   
 
Table 1.3: Changes in the geographic distribution of milk production, South Africa, 
1997 – 2007 
  
Province 
% Distribution of Milk Production 
December 1997 March 2007 
Western Cape 22.9 25.3 
Eastern Cape 13.8 21.8 
Northern Cape 1.2 0.7 
KwaZulu-Natal 15.7 21.1 
Free State 18.0 12.8 
North-West 12.6 7.1 
Gauteng 4.4 3.1 
Mpumalanga 11 7.6 
Limpopo 0.4 0.5 
Coastal regions 52.4 68.2 
Inland regions 47.6 31.8 
Total 100 100 
Source: Coetzee and Maree (2008) 
 
The low-input pasture-based milk production system, pioneered in New Zealand, has also 
been adopted in many other countries and regions such as the US, Australia and Europe. 
The rationale for adopting this system is due to the economic benefits offered by lower 
input (feed, labour, utilities and herd health) costs (Hanson et al., 1998).  Many SA milk 
producers have successfully adopted the low-cost, pasture-based milk production system in 










1.9 Current types of government support for milk producers in selected international 
markets 
 
Internationally, many dairy industries are still highly regulated. As Table 1.4 shows, 
relative to other countries the SA dairy industry is highly deregulated. State support for the 
SA dairy industry has declined substantially since 1971 and current support to producers 
consists of providing funding for research and veterinary services and regulating the 
quality of fresh milk.  Countries with relatively highly regulated dairy industries include 
the US, Canada, the EU and Japan. According to the NAMC (2001:16), milk producers in 
the EU benefit the greatest from government support and this has a disruptive effect on the 
international market. Further evidence of the reduction in statutory support to primary SA 
agriculture is provided by Kirsten et al. (2000) who estimated Producer Subsidy 
Equivalents (PSE) for SA agriculture in 1998. South Africa’s PSE declined from 12.4% in 
1995 to 5.2% in 1998, indicating a substantial reduction in government support. 
 
Table 1.4: Direct government support to milk producers in selected countries, 1971 - 
2006 















Subsidies + +  +  +  
Producer payments + +   + +  
Surplus removal + +  +  +  
Funding research + + + + +  + 
Marketing quotas +   +  +  
Veterinary services + + + + +  + 
Fixed price  +  +  +  
Quality control + + + + + + + 
Source: NAMC (2001:16); Blayney et al. (2006) 
a. EU = European Union 
b. RSA = Republic of South Africa 
 
New Zealand, a major role-player in the global dairy market (Blayney et al., 2006), was 
the only country with a lower PSE than South Africa with an estimate of 0.8% in 1998.  
With deregulation and trade policy reform have come greater exposure and vulnerability of 
market participants to global events and trends (Chitiga et al., 2008). The reduction in 







industries in other countries, the SA dairy industry may be at a competitive disadvantage 
in terms of global trade in dairy products. South African exports of milk and dairy products 
(milk, cream and other processed products) to Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) countries has shown an increasing trend over the period 1994 to 2000 when 
exports increased by 97.5% (Vink et al., 2002). Opportunities for exports to developed 
countries such the US and United Kingdom (UK) are difficult for market participants in the 
SA dairy industry to take advantage of due to the relatively poor quality of milk produced. 
In recent years many countries have introduced stricter milk quality standards especially in 
terms of milk’s Somatic Cell Count (SCC), which is used as a non-tariff trade barrier to 
protect domestic milk producers in those countries (Phillips, 2007a).   
 
Blayney et al. (2006) note that, globally, consumer preferences for dairy products, 
especially concentrated dairy products, are shifting rapidly with consumers now favouring 
foods with added features. For example, in countries with higher disposable income per 
capita, consumption of yoghurt products is rising faster than in countries with lower 
disposable incomes. They also found that the per capita consumption of milk is declining 
in developed countries, such as Australia, the US and Japan but is growing in developing 
countries such as Mexico, Singapore and China. Since deregulation, market participants in 
the SA dairy industry have, therefore, had to re-position themselves as competitors within 
the global environment and become more receptive and responsive to changing policy and 
market conditions, locally and internationally, in order to sustain and improve their 







CHAPTER 2  




According to Esterhuizen (2006:99), globalisation and trade liberalisation have provided 
the impetus for business and governments to assess and improve the competitiveness of 
firms, sectors and industries. With deregulation of agricultural markets and trade policy 
reform, SA agricultural producers and agribusinesses have had to adapt to a new 
competitive environment in order to sustain and grow their domestic market share and 
contribute to national economic growth.  
 
The definition of competitiveness, which depends on the level of competitiveness analysis, 
is also crucial in guiding the research methodology. Therefore, it is imperative that an 
unambiguous definition of competitiveness be determined so that an applicable measure of 
competitiveness can then be chosen. Since the objectives of this research are to assess 
changes in competitiveness of milk producers and to analyse factors influencing 
competitiveness at the producer level, an appropriate measure of competitiveness also 
needs to be identified. The aims of this chapter are to define and discuss the concept of 
competitiveness, adopt an appropriate definition of competitiveness to guide the research 
methodology, introduce some common measures of competitiveness, and present the Unit 
Cost Ratio method of measuring competitiveness. 
 
2.2 Competitiveness defined 
 
Siggel (2006) notes that whereas comparative advantage is the true source of 
competitiveness, the concepts of comparative advantage and competitiveness differ in 
terms of distortions created by government policies, e.g. protectionist policies, producer 
price supports, etc. Actual competitiveness is then derived from comparative advantage as 
well as from the advantage gained by domestic firms from government support policies. At 
the microeconomic level, a producer has a comparative advantage if his/her costs of 
production are lower than those of competitors (international and domestic) at the 







advantage include abundance or relative cheapness of either primary or intermediate 
inputs, the use of different or superior technology, or the production of output on a larger 
scale (size economies) (Siggel and Cockburn, 1995; Siggel, 2006). Although, theoretically, 
comparative advantage is the true source of competitiveness, Vollrath (1991) notes that 
researchers are generally confronted with trade data generated in a distorted world under 
conditions of post-trade equilibria where the concept of competitiveness, rather than 
comparative advantage, is more applicable. 
 
Previous research literature notes that the precise definition of competitiveness is subject to 
ambiguity (Kennedy et al., 1997; Ortmann, 2000; Esterhuizen, 2006:90; Siggel, 2006). 
Siggel (2006) accounts for this ambiguity by suggesting that unlike comparative 
advantage, competitiveness has not been as rigorously defined in the early economic 
literature. The difficulty in defining competitiveness has been attributed to its multi-
dimensional applications and interpretations. Some definitions focus on the underlying 
sources of competitiveness whilst others place more emphasis on the indicators of 
competitiveness (Kennedy et al., 1997; Ortmann, 2005; Esterhuizen, 2006:173).  
 
Porter (1998:40) notes that competitive advantage (a form of competitiveness) is derived 
from a firm’s organizational structure and the way in which it performs its activities. 
Furthermore, he argues that to gain competitive advantage, a firm must perform crucial 
activities more efficiently than rivals (lower cost advantage) or perform these activities in a 
unique way thereby generating increased buyer value and commanding a premium price 
(differentiation advantage).  
 
Cantwell (2005:544) defines competitiveness as the possession of necessary capabilities 
needed for sustained economic growth in a competitive environment in which there are 
others that have equivalent but different sets of capabilities. Spies (1999) refers to the 
societal conditions and structures that promote an environment of ‘continuous technical 
innovation’ as being the most crucial in improving national competitiveness. Also implied 
is that in the pursuit of competitiveness, innovation has an increasingly important role to 
play in that through meaningful competition, innovation is stimulated and results in lower 
costs and improved product quality within an industry, thereby increasing product demand 








There is, however, general consensus in the literature regarding the following 
characteristics of competitiveness: competitiveness is a relative concept and relates to the 
profitable maintenance and/or gain of domestic and/or international market share by a 
firm, sector or industry (Frohberg and Hartmann, 1997; Kennedy et al., 1997; Cantwell 
2005:545; Esterhuizen, 2006:89). Esterhuizen (2006:89) provides the following definition 
of competitiveness: “Competitiveness is the ability of a sector, industry or firm to compete 
successfully in order to achieve sustainable growth within the global environment while 
earning at least the opportunity cost of returns on resources employed”.   
 
Esterhuizen’s definition of competitiveness incorporates all the essential features required 
for the purposes of this study. Therefore, based on Esterhuizen’s definition, 
competitiveness in this study is defined as the ability of a milk producer to achieve 
sustainable business growth while earning at least the opportunity cost of management. 
Therefore, a producer is considered to be competitive if positive returns to land are earned. 
 
2.3 Levels and measures of competitiveness analysis 
 
Macro and microeconomic concepts of competitiveness differ distinctly in terms of their 
objectives in competitiveness analyses due to the desired outcomes of those analyses 
(Esterhuizen, 2006:89). Methods such as the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) and 
Relative Trade Advantage methods developed by Balassa (1965) and Vollrath (1991), 
respectively, are examples of commonly used macroeconomic measures of 
competitiveness. Porter (2005:43) argues that most of the discussion regarding 
competitiveness is focused on macroeconomic, social and legal policies that form the basis 
of a successful economy and that these factors are necessary but not sufficient in 
explaining competitiveness. Porter (2005:43) maintains that although the implementation 
of proper statutory institutions provides the opportunity to create wealth (competitiveness), 
these do not create wealth themselves. This is due to the fact that wealth is created at the 
microeconomic level by the capabilities of a nation’s companies, a process driven by the 
microeconomic business environment in which these companies compete.  
 
Siggel (2006) concurs and suggests that the microeconomic concept of competitiveness has 
a firmer theoretical foundation than the macroeconomic concept. He attributes this to the 







focuses on the particular characteristics of each individual producer or firm competing 
directly for market share. According to Frohberg and Hartmann (1997), competitiveness 
analyses may differ spatially, ranging from the farm/firm to national levels and also in 
terms of product aggregation.  Table 2.1 provides an overview of the various ways 
competitiveness can be measured spatially and in terms of product aggregation. 
 
Table 2.1: Analyses of competitiveness according to level of product aggregation and 
spatial extension 
Product Aggregation Farms Regions within a 
country 
Countries 
Entire Economy No No Yes 
Single Industry No Yes Yes 
Single Commodity Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Frohberg and Hartmann (1997) 
 
Table 2.1 shows that, depending on the level of investigation, analyses of competitiveness 
may differ both spatially and in terms of the level of product aggregation. For example, the 
competitiveness of a single product can be measured at the country, region or single 
farm/firm basis.  
 
Frohberg and Hartmann (1997) and Siggel (2006) further note that in addition to the 
various spatial and product level analyses of competitiveness, past competitive 
performance (ex-post) or the outcome of competitiveness and potential competitive 
performance (ex-ante) can also be measured. The difference between the two concepts is 
that ex-post indicators or measures of competitiveness are deterministic in nature, in that 
costs, prices and market shares are directly observed. Some commonly used ex-post 
measures of competitiveness include Trade and Market Share Indicators, Real Exchange 
Rate, and Foreign Direct Investment. Real Exchange Rate usually measures the 
competitiveness of an entire economy (Frohberg and Hartmann, 1997). Ex-ante measures 
are, however, stochastic in nature and consist of a number of variables which are composed 
within a model used to measure potential competitiveness. The following section discusses 









2.4 Previous research on the competitiveness of agricultural commodities in South 
Africa 
 
Vink et al. (1998) studied the international competitiveness of Western Cape wheat 
production using producer profitability comparisons of wheat production per hectare as a 
proxy for competitiveness. Producer gross incomes and production costs were also 
included in the comparison. Data from international competitors incorporated in the study 
included Argentina, Australia, Canada, Britain, Germany, the US and Zimbabwe. The 
study found that Western Cape wheat production was not internationally competitive. 
Wheat producers in countries having lower yields per hectare were found to have three 
times the net gross margin of SA producers. The study attributed this finding to the newly 
deregulated wheat industry, noting that producers were still in a transition phase where 
production inefficiencies were still apparent. The study concluded that to survive in the 
global market, SA wheat producers needed to adapt their production practices to the 
market’s willingness to pay.  
 
Venter and Horsthemke (1999) applied Porter’s Diamond Model approach in their study on 
the competitive nature of the SA sheep meat value chain. Southern African countries 
included in the analysis were Namibia and South Africa and data from these countries were 
compared with data from Australia. The study found that Australia was more competitive 
than both South Africa and Namibia in terms of mutton production but was not competitive 
in terms of lamb production. The study identified that an important factor constraining 
improvements in the competitiveness of the sheep meat value chain was the high cost 
associated with value adding by market participants in the retail sector. The study 
recommended that SA producers add more features to sheep meat products thereby 
generating greater customer value, and also that role-players within the red meat industry 
form strategic alliances to improve the overall value chain competitiveness.  
 
Mosoma (2004) investigated agricultural competitiveness and supply chain interactions 
between South Africa, Argentina and Australia using the Relative Trade Advantage (RTA) 
method developed by Vollrath (1991). Using export data, Mosoma (2004) found that a 
number of South Africa’s value chains were marginally competitive relative to Australia 
and Argentina. These were the tobacco, maize, tomato, sugar and grape value chains. 







adding opportunities through aggressive research and the development of new products 
and production techniques. 
 
Esterhuizen and van Rooyen (2006) measured the competitiveness of the SA wine industry 
and identified factors affecting that competitiveness. Using the Relative Trade Advantage 
(RTA) method, Esterhuizen and van Rooyen (2006) measured the operational trading 
performance of SA wines relative to international competitors. Key success factors 
affecting the competitiveness of the wine industry were found to be intense competition 
between market participants, the production of affordable, high quality products, efficient 
supporting industries and the availability of internationally competitive local suppliers of 
primary inputs. The study found that the SA wine industry was highly competitive 
internationally relative to countries such as Australia, Chile, Italy and New Zealand. In 
conclusion, Esterhuizen and van Rooyen (2006) noted that fluctuations in the exchange 
rate, trust in the political support system, the competence of administrative personnel in the 
public sector and the growth and size of the SA market were important factors for market 
participants to consider to enhance the competitiveness of the SA wine industry in the 
future. 
 
Esterhuizen (2006) analysed the competitiveness of 16 selected food commodity chains in 
South Africa using Balassa’s (1965) RCA method for the period 1961 to 2002. He noted 
that the majority of these commodity chains were marginally competitive and except for 
the maize, pineapple and apple chains competitiveness was found to decline when moving 
from primary to processed products. Fresh milk showed increasing competitiveness in both 
the long- and short-run whilst the competitiveness of other dairy products such as cheese, 
butter, and skim milk have remained unchanged over the period 1961 to 2002. Esterhuizen 
(2006:173) noted that it is of vital importance that the underlying reasons for the non-
competitiveness of some commodity chains be identified. The reasons for the non-
competitiveness of these commodity chains may relate to a lack of technical innovation, 
unproductive labour, high input costs or government trade policy. He concluded by noting 
that strategic international alliances may be a possible solution to improving the 










2.5 Measure of competitiveness used in this study: Unit Cost Ratio (UCR) method 
 
Based on the literature review, the most appropriate method for measuring the 
competitiveness of milk production for the purposes of this study is considered to be the 
UCR method. Popular macroeconomic methods of measuring competitiveness, such as 
RCA and RTA, were not considered suitable because these methods require aggregate 
production and trade data, which were not available for the study area. Porter’s diamond 
model, an analytical method of determining competitive advantage for a firm, industry or 
sector, was also not considered suitable as this method is predominantly used to measure 
current and not past trends in competitive advantage.  
 
The UCR method, developed by Siggel and Cockburn (1995), is a microeconomic method 
of competitiveness analysis best used to distinguish between comparative advantage and 
competitiveness. The method uses three variants, UCRd (domestic competitiveness), UCRx 
(international competitiveness) and UCRs (comparative advantage), of a unit cost indicator 
derived from Ricardian comparative advantage to determine the sources of competitiveness 
for a particular firm or industry. The unit cost indicator used in this study is based on one 
of the three unit cost variants, namely the indicator of domestic competitiveness, UCRd, 
proposed by Siggel (1997). The domestic unit cost indicator for a particular firm is 
structured as follows: 
     
   
  
where UCRd = domestic unit cost ratio,  TC  = total costs, VO  = value of output (total revenue),  
Q = quantity of product, Pd = domestic producer price  
                  
UCRd is a simple ratio of total costs to total revenue for a particular firm and is similar to 
the Private Profitability (PP) ratio used in the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) (Monke and 
Pearson, 1989). The UCR method is preferred to the PAM because the UCR method is 
able to measure the competitiveness of individual producers rather than that of a 
representative farm. Siggel (1997; 2006) maintains that the UCR method has the benefits 
of overcoming differences in product mix and quality that have generally made inter-firm 








need for data from an international competitor (whose costs and prices would be used as a 
comparison) to estimate international competitiveness (UCRx) as the border price, 
representing the unit cost of an international best-practice producer, Pw, can be substituted 
into equation (2.1).  The hallmark of the UCR method, however, is the distinction that can 
be drawn between comparative advantage and competitiveness by using shadow prices, Ps, 
and calculating the distortions created by government policies (Siggel 1997; 2006).  
 
Total costs, reported in equation (2.1), are costs reported by firms that include tradable 
inputs, non-tradable inputs, labour costs and capital costs. In the long-term total costs per 
unit of product, including the opportunity costs of all resources, are expected to equal total 
revenue per unit (product price) (Pasour, 1981; Doll and Orazem, 1984:211-213). In this 
study, an opportunity cost of management is added to total accounting costs while the 
returns to land are regarded as a residual. A UCRd of less than one indicates that a firm 
covers all costs, including the opportunity cost of management, and has positive returns to 
land. Positive returns to land can be a reflection of high factor productivity, relatively low 
factor or input prices and/or higher product prices. A UCRd indicator exceeding one 
indicates that a firm’s returns to land are negative and the firm is, therefore, not considered 
locally competitive.  
 
2.6 Description of the study area and data collection 
 
For the purposes of assessing changes in, and factors influencing, the long-term 
competitiveness of milk producers, data from the East Griqualand (EG) milk producer 
study group were collected for the period 1983 – 2006. The data comprised detailed 
production and financial data for individual milk producers for the study period. Efforts 
were made to incorporate other regions of South Africa in the study but due to logistical 
and time constraints, this objective was not achieved.  
 
East Griqualand (EG) encompasses the areas of Kokstad in southern KZN and Matatiele 
and Cedarville in the Eastern Cape Province. The area is a summer rainfall region and is 
characterised by ‘sourveld’ grazing conditions. Average annual rainfall ranges from 
620mm to 816mm (Camp, 1999). Because of high summer rainfall and relatively high 
altitude, sourveld becomes relatively unpalatable to livestock in autumn and winter. This 







case of milk production, a seasonal fluctuation in rainfall and temperature in EG can give 
rise to greater seasonal variability in milk production (Tainton, 1988:41).  
 
Milk production in EG has traditionally been pasture based with varying rates of 
supplementation of purchased feed. In recent years, however, EG milk producers have 
increased the proportion of pasture in their feeding regimes and are moving towards 
seasonal calving in an effort to improve profitability. This shift has been driven by reduced 
profit margins and more efficient use of facilities and management time (Bischoff, 2008). 
Over the study period a total of 30 milk producers were members of the EG study group, 
which was formed with the objective to improve the production and financial performance 
of its members. This group has received advice from the same consultant throughout the 
study period. Since 1983 a number of milk producers have left while others have joined the 
study group. Currently, the group consists of 23 active commercial milk producers.  
 
Many milk producers in the EG study group include other enterprises (maize and other 
cash crops, sheep, beef) as a means of portfolio diversification whilst others specialise in 
dairy production, taking advantage of size and scope economies. Data collected for each 
EG milk producer are comprised of financial and production data. If the milk producer had 
a diversified farm of which a dairy enterprise is a component, fixed or overhead costs were 
allocated on the basis of gross margin; e.g. if the dairy enterprise contributes 70% to the 
gross margin, 70% of the fixed costs were allocated to the dairy enterprise. Bischoff (2008) 
contends that although this method of allocating fixed costs to an enterprise may be 
arbitrary, experience has confirmed it to be the most suitable.  
 
2.7 Background to marketing arrangements for milk in EG 
 
Prior to 1994 milk production in EG was subject to milk marketing quotas and price 
discrimination administered, on behalf of the Milk Board, by a major milk buyer. Price 
discrimination meant that “quota” milk commanded a higher price than “non-quota” milk, 
acting as an incentive to restrict milk production to quota levels. Following deregulation, 
EG milk producers are no longer obligated to market their product through a single channel 








According to D’Haese and Bostyn (2001), trade policy reform in 1994 increased the import 
opportunities available to international competitors but also allowed entry of international 
competitors into the SA market.  Faced with a changing competitive environment many co-
operatives responded by transforming co-operative principles and structures to those of 
private companies.  In 1994 the major milk buyer in EG registered as an operational 
company and in 1997 a holding company was formed. The process of transforming its 
operational principles from those of a co-operative to a private company was officially 
completed by the milk buyer in 2003 (CloverSA, 2008).  
 
There are currently three major milk buyers operating in EG. Two of the buyers are 
multinational companies who collectively purchase 30% of EG milk. The remaining 70% 
is purchased by the former dairy co-operative (Bischoff, 2008). Bischoff (2008) and 
Broom (2008) suggest that with the major milk buyer in EG now operating as a private 
company, milk producers have lost bargaining power and are subject to relatively greater 
price volatility. The perception by EG milk producers is, therefore, that deregulation has 
largely impacted negatively on their dairy enterprise profitability. Methods of data analysis 








CHAPTER 3  
THE IMPACT OF MARKET DEREGULATION ON THE COMPETITIVENESS 
OF SELECTED COMMERCIAL MILK PRODUCERS IN EAST GRIQUALAND: 




Deregulation in the SA dairy industry was characterised by incremental policy reforms 
over the period 1971 to 1996 giving market participants in the dairy and supporting 
industries time to adapt to the impending change. The objective of the analysis in this 
chapter is to investigate the impact of dairy market deregulation on the competitiveness of 
milk producers who comprise the East Griqualand (EG) study group in KwaZulu-Natal and 
the Eastern Cape Province over the period 1983 to 2006.  
 
3.2 Data  
 
Individual commercial milk producer data from the EG study group were collected for the 
period 1983 – 2006. Although membership of the study group has changed over time, the 
data have been averaged on an annual basis so that trends in real prices and costs, and 
hence UCRd, could be identified.  Over the study period the composition and size (volume 
of milk produced per annum) of EG milk producers have changed. These changes are 
summarised in Table 3.1. According to Bischoff (2008), changes in the composition and 
relative sizes of EG milk producers are due to reduced profit margins over the study 
period. There has also been a shift on EG dairy farms from a higher-cost production system 
to a lower-cost pasture-based system. Over the period 1985 to 2005 many EG farmers 
producing a relatively low annual milk output have been replaced by fewer, larger 
producers who have expanded production capacity, taking advantage of size economies. 
Milk buyers, by offering significant price premiums based on milk output (up to 25c/litre), 
have also encouraged producers to increase herd sizes and milk output.  
 
Based on a definition by Esterhuizen (2006), competitiveness in this study is defined as the 
ability of a milk producer to cover all accounting costs plus an opportunity cost of 







land are earned. Competitiveness in this analysis is measured at the individual milk 
producer level using the UCR method. Total accounting costs, comprised of variable and 
fixed costs, were recorded for each EG milk producer. To total accounting costs an 
opportunity cost of management
9
 at 5% of milk turnover for producer i at time t (Calkins 
and DiPietre, 1987:117) was added - returns to land are regarded as a residual. Thus, milk 
producers with higher revenue will have a higher opportunity cost of management than 
producers with lower revenues. Positive returns to land can be a reflection of high factor 
productivity, relatively low factor or input prices and/or higher product prices.  
 
Table 3.1: Changes in milk production and contribution to total milk production, EG   





% of milk producers 
 
 
% of milk production 
 
 1985 2005 1985 2005 
1 – 500000 50 9 27 1 
500001 - 1500000 33 55 27 34 
> 1500001 17 36 46 65 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Bischoff (2008) 
 
3.3 Method of analysis  
 
Three unit cost indicators of domestic competitiveness, namely UCRL, UCRT and UCRN, 
based on the original UCRd indicator used by Siggel (1997), were used in this analysis. 
These unit cost indicators vary in terms of the domestic price (Pd) used in the calculation of 
VO or total revenue in equation (2.1). PL, used in the calculation of UCRL, is the net local 
milk price paid to producers which, prior to 1992, was determined by milk buyers acting as 
agents for the Milk Board. Premiums have always been paid to milk producers on the basis 
of milk quality (reflected by the milk solid content, i.e. butterfat and protein content) but 
prior to 1992, milk transport was paid by the milk producer. Since 1992 the pricing policy 
                                               
9
 A questionnaire was sent to all current EG milk producers in May 2008 so that individual opportunity costs 
of management time could be derived (see Appendix B). The weighted average of these producers’ own 







of milk buyers has varied substantially between buyers and numerous factors such as 
seasonal production fluctuations, the bacterial content of the milk (reflected by the somatic 
cell count), the volume of milk produced and the distance from the milk buyer depot are 
taken into account when producer prices are determined.  The price received by each milk 
producer is, therefore, net of transport costs and other levies and dependent on quality, 
volume and locational factors.  
 
PT, used in the calculation of UCRT, is the net local producer milk price, PL, plus dairy 
cattle trading income
10
. Dairy cattle trading income can often play an important role in the 
profitability of the dairy enterprise (Broom, 2008). PN, used in the calculation of UCRN, is 
the national producer milk price (net of transport costs) obtained from the NDA (2008). 
Since PN is a standard milk price received by producers, price premiums, based on 
locational and milk volume/quality characteristics received by producers, are removed.     
 
3.4 Results of the UCR analysis 
 
The results of the UCR analysis for different time periods are summarised in Table 3.2 
overleaf. The number of milk producers varied over time and the low number of producers 
from 1983 to 1987 was due to a lack of sufficient data and data collection problems. 
Competitiveness is a relative and dynamic concept and the results presented in Table 3.2 
reflect average sample milk producer competitiveness over time under prevailing 
government policies. For example, a milk producer who was competitive in 1983 may not 
be considered competitive in 2006.  
 
3.4.1 Unit Cost Ratio based on PL (UCRL) 
 
The UCRL shows the relative competitiveness of an average sample milk producer over 
time based on the net local milk price paid to producers, PL. The mean UCRL indicator for 
the EG group fluctuated around one between 1983 and 2006. During this period, the 
average EG milk producer was earning negative returns to land based on the net price 
received for milk. Between 1988 and 1997 the mean UCRL were 1.197 and 1.153, showing 
a decline in competitiveness from 1983. The real net local producer price (2000=100), PL, 
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declined by 19% from R2.04 in 1983 to R1.65 in 1997 while real average total costs per 
litre declined by only 13% over the same period. The decline in relative competitiveness 
can, therefore, be attributed to a larger decline in real price relative to real total costs. 
Relative competitiveness improved in the 1998 to 2006 period but returns to land were still 
negative. 
 
Table 3.2: Results of UCR analysis for the sample EG milk producers, 1983 – 2006 
 Mean UCRd  
Years UCRL UCRT UCRN 








































*Figures in parentheses show the standard deviation of UCR 
 
Responses to rising purchased feed (maize) prices relative to milk prices over time 
(Collins, 1994:63) are evident in the substitution of own-produced forage crops for 
purchased feed by EG milk producers. For example, the average percentage of purchased 
feed costs to total milk revenue for the sample EG milk producers declined from 28.6% in 
1983 to 22.7% in 1988 while the average percentage of own-produced forage costs 
increased from 9.3% to 15.8% in the same period. The relatively high standard deviation of 
UCRL of 0.120 in the period 1983 – 1987 indicates that there was a relatively high 
variation among this (small) group of producers in terms of their returns to land. The 
standard deviation decreased to 0.047 in the period 2003 to 2006 indicating that the 
variation in returns to land among milk producers decreased over time.  
 
3.4.2 Unit Cost Ratio based on PT (UCRT)  
 
The UCRT shows the relative competitiveness of an average milk producer over time based 







Milk producers commonly use trading income to supplement milk income. The inclusion 
of trading income impacted positively on the relative competitiveness of the average EG 
milk producer when compared to the UCRL measure. Returns to land were, however, still 
negative from 1988 to 1997 as the mean UCRT was greater than one. Relative 
competitiveness, however, improved from 1998 to 2006.  
 
The contribution of trading income to PT increased from 8.91% in 1983 to 15.6% in 1989. 
This may be further evidence of reduced profit margins that milk producers were 
experiencing in the late 1980s, with producers relying more on trading income to survive. 
The average contribution of trading income to the net total price declined from 12.1% in 
the period 1983 to 1997 to 9.8% in the period 1998 to 2006. This suggests that gains in 
competitiveness since 1998 were derived from growth in the average real net local price, 
PL, relative to the average real total costs per litre for this period.  
 
3.4.3 Unit Cost Ratio based on PN (UCRN) 
 
The UCRN shows the relative competitiveness of the average sample EG milk producer 
over time based on the national price (net of transport costs), PN, as reported by the NDA 
(2008). The results suggest that the average sample EG milk producer would be earning 
negative returns to land from 1983 to 2002 if PN was received for milk. Relative 
competitiveness declined from 1983 to 1992 and improved slightly from 1993 to 1997. The 
decline in relative competitiveness in the former period can, firstly, be attributed to a 
decline in real PN, which fell from R2.00/litre to R1.41/litre from 1983 to 1992. Secondly, 
real average total costs per litre for the EG group have, in the past, been relatively high and 
have not declined at the same rate as PN. For the period 1983 to 1992 the real total cost per 
litre averaged R1.97 compared with R1.51 for the period 1993 to 2006. The substitution of 
own-produced forage for purchased feed has been an important factor in reducing the 
average total cost per litre for the EG group over time. Relative competitiveness improved 
from 1998 to 2006 with an average UCRN of 1.005 for the period 2003 to 2006.  
 
3.5 Categorisation of EG milk producers based on UCRT 
 
The sample EG milk producers were divided into top one-third and bottom one-third 







investigate the impacts of deregulation on different groups of milk producers and to 
explain why deregulation affects a milk producer more than others.  The results for the 
UCRT analysis based on the two categories are presented in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Mean UCRT indicator results for two categories of the sample EG milk 
producers, 1983 – 2006  
                                     UCRT 
Years Top 1/3 Bottom 1/3 































a. Figures in parentheses show the standard deviation of UCRT 
Note: **,*** denote significant differences between the means at the 5% and 1% levels of probability, 
respectively (see Steel and Torrie, 1980:95). 
 
As Table 3.3 shows, the mean UCRT values were statistically significantly different 
between the two categories of milk producers indicating that the ability to manage 
deregulation differed among the top and bottom one-third sample of milk producers.  
Appendix C shows the average real PL and real total costs per litre for EG milk producers 
in the top and bottom one-third categories from 1983 to 2006. EG milk producers in the 
top one-third category were able to remain relatively competitive from 1983 to 2002 
despite declining national producer milk prices over this period by consistently achieving a 
higher real PL and producing at a lower real cost than producers in the bottom one-third 
category. This finding is consistent with that of Dawson and Hubbard (1987) who found 
that better managed dairy farms in the England and Wales dairy sector were able to 
produce at a lower average cost at any given level of output in 1980/81. 
 
Higher real prices can reflect higher product quality, greater volume produced and/or 
locational advantage (lower transport costs). Lower real costs can reflect the use of 







the top one-third producers declined steadily from 1983 to 2002 and rose on average by 
6% in the period 2003 to 2006 relative to the period 1998 to 2002. Returns to land over this 
period remained positive as the increase in average real total costs was offset by a larger 




Results from the UCRL analysis showed that the average sample EG milk producer did not 
cover all costs, including an opportunity cost of management, based on the net local price, 
PL, received for milk for all periods. Based on the net total price, PT, which included dairy 
cattle trading income, the competitiveness of the average milk producer improved. This 
suggests that during periods of relatively low real milk prices and rising costs, trading 
income plays an important role in enhancing the profitability of a dairy enterprise. The 
UCRN analysis based on the national producer milk price, PN, suggested that the average 
EG milk producer received a real milk price above the national average over the study 
period.  
 
The differences in relative competitiveness between the top and bottom one-third of the 
sample EG milk producers reflects differences in their abilities to manage dairy market 
deregulation. Producers in the top one-third category, based on UCRT, were able to remain 
competitive and earned positive returns to land despite declining real local producer prices 
from 1983 to 2002. Milk producers in the bottom one-third category were not competitive 
over the study period and the differences in relative competitiveness between the top and 
bottom one-third categories were statistically significant. Real price differences between 
the two producer categories can be attributed to milk quality differences, milk volume 
produced and/or locational (dis)advantages and managerial ability. Real cost differences 
can be attributed to the use of superior or cost reducing technologies and/or size 
economies.     
 
During the period of dairy market deregulation, the relative competitiveness of sample EG 
milk producers can be partitioned into two distinct phases, namely: an initial negative 
phase from 1983 to 1997 and a positive phase from 1998 to 2006. The initial negative 
phase, during which EG milk producers were not competitive (based on UCRT), can be 







to 1997. Real local net producer prices were initially high in 1983 but declined steadily 
towards 1997; during this period the net local producer price, PL, was determined by local 
milk buyers in conjunction with the Milk Board. The positive phase from 1998 to 2006, 
during which sample EG milk producers were relatively more competitive (based on 
UCRT), can be attributed primarily to declining real total costs and improving real local 
milk prices. Declining real costs, in response to declining real milk prices from 1983 to 
1997, could have been due to the use of superior technologies, cost-reducing feeding 
regimes (e.g., relative greater use of pastures), and size economies as EG milk producers 
have expanded their production capacity and herd sizes.  
 
This analysis also shows that although there may be correlation between deregulatory 
changes in the dairy industry over the study period and changes in the relative 
competitiveness of EG milk producer, it is difficult to attribute changes in competitiveness 
at the producer-level exclusively to a macroeconomic change such as market deregulation. 
The managerial abilities of sample EG milk producers seem to be crucial in determining 
the impact of deregulation on the relative competitiveness of these producers. Further 
investigation into other factors affecting EG milk producer competitiveness will be 
addressed in the next chapter by analysing panel data of EG milk producers. Results of the 
panel data analysis may also reveal more specific reasons for the improvement in relative 







CHAPTER 4  
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LONG-TERM COMPETITIVENESS OF 





Based on the findings and recommendations of the UCR analysis of the sample EG milk 
producers from 1983 to 2006, this chapter investigates the influence of policy and other 
factors on the long-term competitiveness of selected EG milk producers (who had 
continuous physical and financial records) for the period 1990 to 2006. The period 1990 to 
2006 was chosen due to insufficient data from 1983 to 1989 and the completeness of 
records over the period 1990 to 2006.  Previous research in the United States (US) suggests 
that factors such as dairy herd size, milking rate, specialisation in milk production and 
level of farm debt are important determinants of profitability and hence competitiveness of 
a dairy enterprise (El-Osta and Johnson, 1998; El-Osta and Morehart, 2000; Short 2000; 
Gloy et al., 2002). Much of the previous research has not investigated the factors 
influencing competitiveness over time. This analysis aims to update such past research by 
empirically investigating the factors affecting the long-term competitiveness of a panel of 
EG commercial milk producers. A brief literature review of factors influencing the 
profitability and competitiveness of a dairy enterprise follows in the next section.  
 
4.2 Factors affecting long-term performance of a dairy enterprise  
 
4.2.1 Production factors 
 
According to Hopps and Maher (2007), the competitiveness of milk production is dictated 
by numerous factors, the most important of which are the (gross) margin per litre of milk 
and the total literage (output) of the dairy enterprise. Although the profitability and hence 
competitiveness of the dairy enterprise are jointly dependent on the quantity of factors of 
production employed and the methods with which these factors are employed (Gloy et al., 
2002; Hopps and Maher, 2007), Slater and Throup (1983:73) stress that the highest returns 







dairy enterprise gross margin is influenced by two interrelated forces, namely enterprise 
and system (herd and pasture management) efficiencies. Enterprise efficiency involves the 
interplay and management of the primary contributors to enterprise income and variable 
costs, namely milk sales, purchased feed costs and herd maintenance costs. System 
efficiency relates to the general management of the dairy herd (including young stock) and 
the effective utilisation of available forages. 
 
Previous research suggests that a strong link between farm size (total number of cows) and 
dairy enterprise proftability exists (Manchester and Blayney 1997; El-Osta and Johnson, 
1998; Gloy et al., 2002;). This linkage is supported by Doll and Orazem (1984:217), Short 
(2000) and Clark and Langemeier (2007) whose findings suggest that larger farms produce 
at lower unit cost than smaller farms. Tauer (2001) contends, however, that small, 
efficiently managed farms may be competitive relative to large farms in terms of their 
production costs. However, Tauer’s analysis ignores the imputed costs of family labour 
which would reduce the claimed cost advantages of the smaller dairy farms.  
 
Short (2000) found that feed and labour efficiency were positively related to dairy herd 
(farm) size. Possible reasons for this finding are differences in herd composition, the use of 
superior genetics, ration composition, intensity of feed management and/or more modern 
parlour facilities. Using regression analysis, Short (2000) also showed that dairy herd size, 
production per cow and debt-to-assest (DA) ratio had a significant effect on net farm 
income (NFI), accounting for 95% of the total variation in NFI.  
 
El-Osta and Johnson (1998) identify factors such as specialization in milk production, 
economies of size, tax reductions, and off-farm investment for causing farm expansion in 
the US. Many authors have also noted that, in general, the degree of management skill and 
technological sophistication increases with the size of a dairy farm businesses (El-Osta and 
Johnson, 1998; Blignaut 1999; El-Osta and Moehart, 2000). Other production factors that 
have a significant influence on the proftability of the dairy enterprise are the milking rate 
(production per cow) (Short, 2000; Gloy et al., 2002), and the type of parlour and record 
keeping system used (Gloy et al., 2002). The type of parlour, firstly, influences the rate at 
which cows are milked and, hence, the total number of cows that can be milked, and, 
secondly, modern parlour types have been designed to meet more stringent hygiene 







crucial herd production data is more easily achieved by using electronic rather than manual 
record-keeping systems which means that valuable management time can be spent on more 
important management tasks. Modern parlours are also able to integrate the design of the 
parlour with the record-keeping system which can reduce the costs of collecting and 
analysing production data and free-up management time (Gray, 2009).  
 
4.2.2 Financial, management and risk factors  
 
Diversification is an important risk-management strategy employed by producers to reduce 
the overall risk in their portfolio of farm enterprises (Hardaker et al., 2004:273). However, 
in terms of milk production Slater and Throup (1983:24) suggest that, over time, due to 
technological advancements and a “cost/price squeeze”, milk producers tend to become 
more specialized towards milk production by eliminating less profitable enterprises. The 
inference, therefore, is that, over time, milk producers will tend to specialise in milk 
production to become more competitive. Milk producers are then expected to adopt 
alternative risk-management strategies. El-Osta and Morehart (2000) suggest that as milk 
producers in the US became more specialized towards milk production the likelihood of 
becoming a top producer increased by 23%. The latter statement may seem ambiguous but 
it should be interpreted as the odds of a producer being in one performance group relative 
to another.     
 
Financial ratios are commonly used as measures of farm financial management (Van Zyl et 
al.,1999:77). The debt-to-asset ratio, measuring the proportion of a farm’s assets financed 
with debt, is a popular measure of farm solvency (El-Osta and Johnson, 1998; Short, 2000; 
Gloy et al., 2002). Associated with higher levels of debt is an obligation on the part of the 
producer to pay greater principal and interest. Higher debt may, therefore, lower 
profitability. El-Osta and Johnson (1998) note that the use of debt is closely related to age 
of the producer. Older, established producers are less likely to use debt and tend to scale 
down production while younger producers are more likely to accept relatively greater risk 
to expand their farm businesses. Both El-Osta and Johnson (1998) and Tauer and Mishra 
(2006) found that older milk producers were less efficient than younger milk producers and 
had higher unit costs. Gloy et al. (2002) found that human capital factors such as age and 
education did not significantly affect profitability, while the labour wage rate did have a 







4.3 Key physical and financial characteristics of the panel of EG milk producers 
 
Data were collected from 11 commercial milk producers from the EG study group who had 
continuous physical and financial records for the period 1990 to 2006. The sample of 11 
producers represents 48% (11/23) of the current group of 23 commercial EG milk 
producers and is, according to Bischoff (2008), typical of EG milk producers. The total 
sample size for the panel of EG milk producers is 187 (17 years × 11 milk producers) with 
10 observations missing from the dataset.  
 
Some key physical and financial characteristics of this panel of producers is summarised in 
Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Mean physical and financial characteristics of panel of EG milk producers, 
1990 - 2006 
 
Milk producer characteristics 
1990 – 1995 
n = 63* 
1996 – 2001 
n = 63* 
2002 – 2006 
n = 51* 
Real milk price
a
 (R/litre)  1.52 1.42 1.49 
Real costs
a,b
 (R/litre)  1.55 1.40 1.40 
Dairy herd size (cows in milk) 143 202 299 
Production per cow (Litres per annum) 5180 4882 4585 
Enterprise Mix (% 
contribution to gross 
farm income) 
Dairy  69 70 79 
Beef 10 9 7 
Sheep
c 
7 3 1 
Cash crops 6 10 4 
Maize 5 5 7 









Pasture and forage feed cost to total feed cost 
(TFC) (% of TFC) 
39% 43% 48% 
Trading income
e
 to total income (% of total 
milk income) 
13% 10% 11% 
Source: Bischoff (2008) 
* periods 1990-1995 and 1996-2001 consist of 6 years of data while period 2002-2006 has 5 years of data.  
a. Prices measured in Rands (2000=100) 
b. Total real costs include an opportunity cost of management at 5% of milk turnover (following Calkins and 
Dipietre 1983:117). 
c. The sheep enterprise includes income from the sale of wool. 
d. Range of debt-to-asset ratio shown in parentheses  







Table 4.1 shows that the real milk price and real total costs per litre of milk for the sample 
of EG milk producers have declined marginally over time. Under conditions of declining 
producer prices, the pressure on a relatively small firm to expand is great if size economies 
exist (Doll and Orazem, 1984:215). 
 
Although these producers have expanded the size of their dairy enterprises over the study 
period from a mean of 143 to 299 cows in milk, Bischoff (2008) contends that water 
availability (rather than farm area) has constrained further expansion of EG dairy 
enterprises (Bischoff, 2008). The decline in mean milk production per cow may be 
attributed to the substitution of pasture and forages for purchased feeds (to reduce total 
feed costs) as shown by the increasing ratio of pasture and forage costs to total feed costs 
for the sample of EG milk producers over the study period.  
 
Cross-breeding has also played a role in lowering production per cow over the study period 
due to smaller, more mobile type cattle being favoured over larger, heavier animals which 
also have higher feed requirements (Bischoff, 2008). Although milk production per cow is 
lower when smaller animals are used, production per unit area is greater as the producer is 
able to increase the stocking rate on pasture. However, increased productivity per unit area 
reaches a critical threshold, which depends on the pasture and animals, past which 
productivity declines (Jones and Sandland, 1974). Approximately five of the 11 (45%) EG 
milk producers practice cross-breeding to some extent while the remaining six producers 
have herds of mixed breed or purebred (Holstein or Jersey) cattle.  
 
In general, a milk producer needs to consider several factors before deciding on an 
appropriate husbandry practice to implement. These are: (1) the relative prices of inputs 
such as purchased feeds and fertiliser, (2) the viability of expanding the pasture area, and 
(3) the pricing policy of the milk buyer and premiums offered (quality, volume/distance). 
None of the 11 EG milk producers are registered dairy cattle breeders and, therefore, 
trading income reflects mainly the sale of bull calves and cull cows (Bischoff, 2008). 
 
The mean debt-to-asset ratio fluctuated marginally over the study period. Relatively higher 
average debt use during the 1996 to 2001 period may have been used to fund enterprise 
expansion over this period. The range in debt-to-asset ratio, however, suggests that 







debt, a number producers made greater use of debt. Bischoff (2008) notes that most of the 
expansion in dairy enterprise size took place in the past five years. The debt-to-asset ratio 
in periods 1990 to 1995, 1996 to 2001 and 2002 to 2006 had ranges of 0.38, 0.39 and 0.49 
respectively. The enterprise mix shows that the sample of farmers are somewhat 
diversified, although specialisation in milk production has increased with milk income 
increasing from 69% to 79% of gross farm income over the study period. Diversification is 
a common risk management strategy in EG due in part to large farm sizes and existing 
output-specific facilities, e.g. sheep and cattle handling facilities which may be a vestige of 
previous generations (Bischoff, 2008). The proportion of trading income to total milk 
income has declined marginally over the study period.   
 
4.4 Panel data regression analysis 
 
4.4.1 Theoretical model 
 
Panel data regression analysis differs from conventional time series and cross-section 
regression analyses in that time series as well as cross-section dimensions are incorporated 
into the model’s structure (Baltagi, 2005:11; Gujarati, 2003:636). There is substantial 
debate on the suitability of either a random or fixed effects model to a panel data set. 
Baltagi (2005:12) notes that a fixed effects model is an appropriate specification if the 
focus is on a specific set of N firms and inference is limited to the behaviour of these firms. 
Baltagi (2005:12) notes further that the random effects specification is appropriate if N 
individuals are randomly drawn from a large population as in the case of household 
studies. Since this study examines firm-specific effects, a fixed effects specification is 
considered the most appropriate. Equation (4.1) shows the general form of a fixed effects 
regression model: 
  
                                        (4.1) 
                     
Where i denotes individual milk producers, t denotes time, α1 represents the intercept of 
the base category producer, αk is the differential intercept coefficient indicating the 
difference between α1 and the intercept estimates for the other milk producers (k = 2,..., 11 
milk producers), Dki are differential intercept dummy variables used to account for the 







explanatory variables), and µit is the error term. If the researcher wants to analyse for 
statistically significant differences between firms or individuals, the fixed effects 
regression model can be easily modified by using differential intercept dummies to take 
into account the ‘individuality’ of each firm or individual. The fixed effects model can then 
be referred to as a least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model (Gujarati, 2003:642).  
 
According to Baltagi (2005:4-9), panel data have several advantages over purely time-
series or cross-section data. Firstly, panel data suggests that heterogeneity exists amongst 
individuals, firms, industries or countries. Not controlling for this heterogeneity, as is the 
case in purely time series and cross-section data, may lead to biased results. Secondly, 
panel data can give more information, greater variability, less collinearity among variables, 
more degrees of freedom and lower standard errors of the estimated coefficients 
(efficiency). Thirdly, because panel data take into account changes in the characteristics of 
individuals over time, they are better able to analyse the dynamics of adjustment. Finally, 
panel data are better able to identify and measure effects not observed in purely time-series 
and/or cross-section data.  
 
4.4.2 Selection of variables used in the panel data regression model 
 
(i) Unit Cost Ratio (UCRit) 
 
Variables that were considered in the fixed effects panel regression models are presented 
and defined in Table 4.2 overleaf. Following Siggel and Cockburn (1995) and Siggel 
(2006), a microeconomic method, the UCR, is used to measure competitiveness at the milk 
producer level in this study (dependent variable). The UCR methodology has been adapted 
and simplified in this study and is the ratio of total dairy enterprise costs to total dairy 
enterprise revenue for a milk producer. An opportunity cost of management, calculated at 
5% of total milk revenue for producer i at time t, following Calkins and Dipietre 
(1983:117), was added to total accounting costs.  The UCRit indicator (based on local price 
plus trading income, PT)  is interpreted as follows: a score of >1 indicates that producer i 
earned negative rents (returns to land) at time t and was not competitive (total costs > total 
revenue). A score of <1 indicates that producer i earned positive rents at time t and was 








(ii) Natural logarithm of number of cows (LNCOWSit) 
 
El-Osta and Johnson (1998), El-Osta and Morehart (2000), Short (2000) and Gloy et al. 
(2002) have used dairy herd size as a measure of dairy farm size. For the purposes of this 
study, the natural logarithm of size, LNCOWSit was used. The effect of this transformation 
is to normalise the size distribution by compressing the upper tail of the distribution whilst 
expanding the lower tail (Havemann, 1993). Ceteris paribus, a unitary change in the dairy 
herd size for a small milk producer will have a greater impact on competitiveness than for 
a large milk producer.  Because dairy herd size could be positively related to profitability, 
it is hypothesised that there will be a negative relationship between farm size and UCRit. 
Therefore, as dairy herd size increases UCRit is expected to decrease, ceteris paribus, 
indicating an improvement in competitiveness.   
 
Table 4.2: Definition of variables used in fixed effects regression models 
Variables Definition Expected sign of β/α 
coefficients 
UCRit  Unit Cost Ratio: Measure of milk producer 
competitiveness (dependent variable). 
 
LNCOWSit Dairy herd size (number of cows-in-milk). - 
PRODCOWit Production per cow (litres per annum). - 
SPECIALISEit Specialisation index (proportion of gross 
farm income made up of milk income). 
- 
TRADINCit Ratio of trading income to total milk income. - 
PASCOSTit Ratio of pasture and forage costs to total 
feed costs. 
- 
DEBTASSETit Solvency ratio (farm assets financed by debt 
capital). 
+ 
YEARt Trend variable - 
Di Differential intercept dummies accounting 
for differences between milk producers. 
+/- 
 
(iii) Milk production per cow (PRODCOWit) 
 
El-Osta and Johnson (1998), Short (2000) and Gloy et al. (2002), have found that milking 
rate (production per cow) is significantly related to farm profitability. Although in the long 







size (Chavas and Klemme, 1986), the productivity of dairy cattle is still considered to be 
an important factor contributing to the profitability of the dairy enterprise.  According to 
Gloy et al. (2002), milking rate (production per cow) is assumed to contain latent 
characteristics of the milk producer’s knowledge, experience, husbandry policy and 
feeding practices. It is hypothesised, therefore, that a higher milk production per cow, 
PRODCOWit, will enhance milk producer competitiveness and therefore lower UCRit, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
(iv) Specialisation in milk production (SPECIALISEit) 
 
The specialisation index, SPECIALISEit, was used in preference to more complex 
measures of divesification such as the Herfindahl Index11. The specialisation index used in 
this study  is defined as the ratio of total milk enterprise income to gross farm income. As a 
producer reaches complete specialisation in milk production, the specialisation index, 
therefore, tends towards one. A similar index was used by El-Osta and Morehart (2000). 
Since previous research has shown that greater specialisation in dairy farming is positively 
correlated to enterprise profitability (El-Osta and Johnson, 1998; El-Osta and Morehart, 
2000; Short, 2000), it is hypothesised that as a milk producer tends towards specialisation 
in milk production, competitiveness improves (UCRit declines), ceteris paribus.    
 
(v) Trading income as a ratio of total milk income received (TRADINCit) 
 
Chavas and Klemme (1986) note that the capital value of dairy animals is influenced by 
milk prices, total feed costs, slaughter prices and animal age. Dairy cows are generally 
culled due to low milk productivity and/or reproduction problems that lower their breeding 
and/or milk producing value relative to their slaughter value. According to Broom (2008) 
and Bischoff (2008), dairy enterprise trading income, TRADINCit, is an important 
contributor to the overall profitability of the dairy enterprise. Richards and Jeffery (1997) 
suggest that milk producers also have an incentive to cull older cows if they are expanding 
their overall herd size. This is because a slower rate of herd adjustment may slow the rate 
of the herd’s genetic progress, ultimately resulting in slower productivity growth and a loss 
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   where D = diversification index and pi  = the proportion of income contributed by the ith 







of competitive advantage relative to other milk producers. Milk producers with a higher 
ratio of trading income to total milk income could, therefore, be considered to be more 
competitive than milk producers with a lower ratio, ceteris paribus. 
 
(vi) Forage costs as a proportion of total feed costs (PASCOSTit) 
 
The PASCOSTit variable measures the ratio of forage and pasture costs to total feed costs. 
According to Standard Bank (2007), between 60% and 80% of a milk producer’s total cost 
comprises feed costs. Studies by Hanson et al. (1998) have shown that milk producers in 
the US have tended towards a New Zealand style pasture milk production system to try and 
lower feed costs and improve enterprise profitability. In recent years many SA producers 
have also followed the New Zealand pasture-based system (Bischoff, 2008). Therefore, in 
this study it is hypothesised that, due to the incentive to lower feed costs, EG milk 
producers will tend to rely less on purchased feeds and more on pastures and forage, given 
the availability of land and water, to enhance competitiveness in the long-term. A higher 
ratio of pasture costs to total feed costs is expected to improve competitiveness (UCRit 
declines), ceteris paribus. 
(vii) Farm solvency ratio (DEBTASSETit) 
 
DEBTASSETit, a measure of farm solvency, was also included in the model. Data on debt 
levels attributable exclusively to the dairy enterprise were not available and, therefore, the 
farm business debt-to-asset ratio was used. The use of debt has been shown by previous 
research to negatively affect profitability as by using debt the producer is obligated to pay 
more interest (and capital) (El-Osta and Johnson, 1998; Short, 2000; Gloy et al., 2002). 
Therefore, as debt use increases, competitiveness is expected to decline (UCRit increases), 
ceteris paribus.  
 
Gloy et al. (2002) suggests that the debt-to-asset ratio would be an endogenous variable in 
a profitability model, i.e. that a two-way relationship between the debt-to-asset ratio and 
competitiveness (UCRit) exists. If a two-way relationship exists, estimation using OLS will 
result in biased, inefficient parameter estimates due to correlation between the dependent 
variable and the stochastic disturbance (error) term. Gloy et al. (2002) postulate that a 







expansion of a dairy enterprise, to increase profitability, may require greater use of debt. 
For the purposes of this study, the possibility of DEBTASSETit being an endogenous 
variable was not taken into account as, firstly, the debt-to-asset ratio used reflects overall 
farm business debt and, therefore, debt attributable to other enterprises is also included. 
Secondly, milk producers may also utilise liquid assets as an alternative to using more 
debt. For example, a milk producer may consider reducing the herd’s culling rate in the 
short-run to expand herd size. Thirdly, according to Bischoff (2008), most EG milk 
producers have utilised more debt to invest in capital intensive technologies (parlours, 
milking equipment, etc.) only in the latter part of the study period (2002 – 2006).    
 
(viii) Trend variable (YEARt) 
 
A trend variable, YEARt, is used as a proxy for technology and policy changes over the 
study period. New technologies, such as herringbone or rotary milking parlours, Artificial 
Insemination (AI) practices and dairy animal genetics, are continuously being improved 
and are expected to raise productivity and lower unit costs (El-Osta and Morehart, 2000) 
thereby improving competitiveness. Since institutions play a crucial role in either 
enhancing or constraining the competitiveness of firms, sectors and industries within a 
nation’s economy (Porter, 2005:43), YEARt is also expected to capture deregulatory 
changes over the study period.  To remain profitable, EG milk producers are expected to 
adapt to this change. The expected sign of the coefficient for YEARt is negative as 
technological change enhances competitiveness.  
 
(ix) Differential intercept dummy variables (D2i....D11i) 
 
Ten differential intercept dummy variables, Di, were added to the model to avoid the 
dummy variable trap (11 producers). These individual milk producer dummy variables 
were added on the basis of a restricted F-test (Appendix C) which suggested that 
management factors such as husbandry policy, parlour type, record keeping system and the 
breed of cow used may differ between EG milk producers. According to Gujarati 
(2003:642), selection of the base category individual is at the discretion of the researcher. 
The base category milk producer chosen had the largest dairy herd size (1472 cows in 
milk) in 2006 and was chosen so that differences between milk producers could be better 







4.5 Ridge regression  
 
Initial results for the panel data regression analysis revealed evidence of multicollinearity 
between the dairy herd size variable, LNCOWSit, and the individual milk producer 
dummies. The term multicollinearity refers to a linear relationship between the explanatory 
variables in a regression model (Gujarati, 2003:342). Regression coefficients estimated in 
the presence of multicollinearity have large standard errors and cannot be estimated 
reliably or precisely and will cause the researcher to make erroneous inferences on the 
relative effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable (Zhang and Ibrahim, 
2005). According to Gujarati (2003:362), a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) that exceeds 10 
is a positive indication of collinearity between explanatory variables. When testing for 
multicollinearity VIF values as well as zero order correlations between explanatory 
variables should be used. 
 
Ridge regression is one of a host of remedial measures used to overcome multicollinearity. 
Ridge regression is a modification of OLS regression that introduces a small bias into the 
regression model so that the estimated coefficients have a greater probability of estimating 
their true parameters (Neter et al., 1990:412). The biasing constant, c, is estimated 
subjectively from a simultaneous plot of standardised regression coefficients known as a 
ridge trace. Values of c vary between 0 and 1. As c is increased, values of the estimated 
coefficients fluctuate greatly until a point where these fluctuations decline in magnitude. 
The lowest value of c for which the regression coefficients become stable is the biasing 
constant used in the ridge regression model. The biasing constant, c, in this study was 0.75.   
 
4.6 Multiple imputation 
 
Due to problems with data availability 10 of the 187 total observations (17 years x 11 milk 
producers) were missing. Therefore, two separate regression models were estimated; an 
imputed and unbalanced12 model. Missing data is a common problem in economic research 
(Baltagi, 2005:165). Single imputation or the filling in of missing observations is the 
simplest and most naive method of completing a dataset. One of the major flaws with 
                                               
12
 A panel dataset is referred to as unbalanced when the number of observations differs between panel 







single imputation, however, is that it does not take into account the extra variability created 
by missing observations, causing inferences on the imputed dataset to be too sharp (Rubin, 
1987:13).   
 
To estimate the missing observations, this study used Multiple Imputation (MI) and 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in the EG milk producer dataset. For each 
missing observation m values are imputed to create m complete datasets; in this case m = 
20. Imputations, to replace missing values, are then randomly drawn from the imputed 
datasets whose distribution corresponds to the distribution of the original data (assumed to 
be normal in this analysis). Because only 5.3% of the dataset is missing, significant 
differences between the imputed and unbalanced ridge regression models are not expected. 
(For a full discussion on MI and MCMC, please see Rubin (1987) and Gilks et al., (1996)). 
The imputed and unbalanced regression models were estimated using the SAS Version 9.1 
Statistical Package for Windows (SAS, 2003).  
 
4.7 Results of the Ridge regression analysis 
 
The results for the fixed effects model with imputed observations for the panel of EG milk 
producers is presented in Table 4.3 overleaf. Results of the fixed effects model for the 
unbalanced panel dataset are shown in Appendix D. The overall fit of the model was 
statistically significant with an F-statistic of 13.7. The R
2
 value of 0.58, indicating that 
58% of the variation in UCRit was explained by the explanatory variables, is comparable to 
similar studies on dairy enterprise profitability and milk producer competitiveness. The 
estimated coefficient for dairy herd size, LNCOWSit, had the expected negative sign which 
supports a priori expectations that the size of the dairy enterprise influences 
competitiveness in the long-term. This finding provides evidence of returns to size on EG 
dairy farms. The gain in competitiveness from increasing herd size, however, will tend to 












Table 4.3: Results of a fixed effects Ridge regression model for a panel of EG milk 
producers, including imputed observations, 1990 – 2006 (n=187)  
Parameter β-coefficient Standardised 
coefficient 
Std error t - statistic 





-0.0408 0.0189 -1.40 
TRADINC -0.198
 























   
     
Base category 1.235  0.0394 31.3*** 
D2 -0.0231 -00610 0.0107 -2.16** 
D3 -0.0347 -0.0916 0.0109 -3.18*** 
D4 0.0282 0.0744 0.0110 2.56*** 
D5 0.0126
 
0.0332 0.0112 1.12 
D6 0.0153
 






D8 0.0575 0.152 0.0107 5.37*** 
D9 -0.0248 -0.0655 0.0109 -2.28** 









 = 0.58  Adjusted  R
2
 = 0.54 df = 169 
    F- statistic = 13.7***  d = 2.29 
Note: *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
LNCOWS       = natural logarithm of number of cows 
PASCOST       = ratio of pasture and forage costs to total feed costs 
TRADINC       = ratio of trading income to total milk income 
SPECIALISE   = ratio of milk income to gross farm income 
PRODCOW     = production per cow  
DEBTASSET  = debt/asset ratio 
YEAR              = Trend variable 








The estimated coefficient of PASCOSTit had the expected sign but was not a statistically 
significant determinant of long-term competitiveness for the 11 EG milk producers. The 
non-significant coefficient of this variable may indicate that pasture-based dairy farming is 
already an established method of production among the 11 milk producers, suggesting that 
there is little variation in this variable in the data. Another possible explanation is that 
many EG milk producers are unable to utilise more pasture due to constraints such as farm 
size, suitability of soil type to pasture and water availability. The negative sign of the 
estimated coefficient suggests, however, that an increased utilisation of forage and pasture 
enhances competitiveness. The coefficient estimate of TRADINCit, is statistically 
significant and has the expected sign, supporting a priori expectations that trading income 
affects the overall profitability of the EG dairy enterprise.  
 
The coefficient estimate of SPECIALISEit, a measure of specialisation in milk production, 
did not have the expected sign and was not statistically significant. A possible explanation 
for this can be found in research by Beca (2005), who analysed the variation in profitability 
of average and top milk producers in South Africa, New Zealand and Australia. He found 
that costs of production for SA milk producers are higher than in New Zealand and 
Australia. High costs of production coupled with higher interest rates in South Africa 
relative to New Zealand and Australia suggests that SA milk producers face significantly 
higher financial risk. Diversification is an important risk management strategy for EG milk 
producers, as shown in Table 4.1, and although over the study period 1990 to 2006 the 
contribution of milk income to gross farm income increased from 69% to 79%, the benefits 
of diversification may outweigh those of specialisation in EG. 
 
The coefficient estimate of PRODCOWit had the expected negative sign and was 
statistically significant. Bischoff (2008) suggests that concentrates (purchased feeds) are 
essential to maintaining high milk yields but that a feeding regime incorporating high 
levels of purchased feed can also raise production costs. The price premiums offered by 
milk buyers (based on quality, volume and proximity from the milk buyer’s depot) may 
play a crucial role in determining which feeding and husbandry regime EG producers 
adopt. For example, a higher milk price may warrant additional feeding in the short-run, 
i.e. the profit maximizing level of output may shift (to where marginal cost equals marginal 







are implemented, however, high producing dairy cattle have a positive influence on the 
long-term competitiveness of these producers, ceteris paribus.  
 
The coefficient estimate of YEARt was statistically significant and had the expected 
negative sign, showing that the competitiveness of these producers has been improving 
over time. Possible reasons for this positive trend are: (1) consolidation of the dairy 
enterprise enabling these farmers to produce higher milk volumes and capture economies 
of size; (2) improved production techniques such as superior irrigation methods and 
improvements to milking parlours; and (3) greater focus on dairy enterprise management 
by these milk producers. YEARt was also a proxy for policy change (deregulation) over the 
study period. The statistical significance and expected negative sign of the estimated 
coefficient suggests that some of the sample EG milk producers have adapted favourably 
to policy change over the study period. The results indicate that these producers have 
become more efficient (produce at lower cost) and have adopted strategies that enhance 
their competitiveness in a deregulated dairy market.   
 
The coefficient estimate of DEBTASSETit was statistically significant and shows that the 
level of farm debt negatively influences competitiveness of the sample EG milk producers 
in the long-term. The positive sign of the estimated coefficient of DEBTASSETit shows 
that as farm debt levels increase, competitiveness declines. This decline can be attributed 
to an obligation on the part of the producer to pay higher levels of principal and interest 
associated with increased indebtedness. This finding is consistent with those of other 
studies on the financial performance of dairy farm businesses but may be misleading in the 
context of EG milk producers. This is because the debt-to-asset ratio used reflects the debt 
level of the entire farm business and, hence, the influence of debt on profitability or 
competitiveness of the dairy enterprise may be overstated.  
 
The standardised coefficients, which show the relative contribution of each explanatory 
variable to the explanation of the dependent variable (UCRit), indicate that LNCOWSit, 
DEBTASSETit, and PRODCOWit, contribute relatively more to the explanation of UCRit 
than do YEARt and TRADINCit. This finding is consistent with other studies that dairy 
enterprise size and debt-to-asset ratio (El-Osta and Johnson, 1998; Short, 2000), and 
production per cow (Short, 2000; Gloy et al., 2002) are important determinants of the 







4.8 Differences between milk producers 
 
The inclusion of individual milk producer dummy variables, on the basis of a restricted F-
test, improved the overall significance and fit of the model. The coefficient estimates of 
D2, D3, D4, D8, D9, D10 and D11 are statistically significant. The negative signs of the 
estimated coefficients of D2, D3, D9 and D11 and positive signs of the estimated coefficients 
of D4, D8 and D10 indicate that these producers were significantly more and less 
competitive than the base category producer, respectively. The differences in 
competitiveness between these milk producers and the base category may be due mainly to 
differences in management experience and ability.  
 
4.9 Discussion  
 
Results of the Ridge regression show that size of the dairy enterprise, the debt level of the 
farm business, production per cow, technological and policy changes, and the ratio of 
trading income to total milk income influence the long-term competitiveness of milk 
producers in EG. The findings are consistent with those of similar studies.  
 
The importance of dairy herd size suggests that economies of size exist on the sample EG 
dairy farms. The study also found that while pasture based production systems were not a 
statistically significant determinant of the long-term competitiveness of EG milk producers 
over the study period, pasture-based systems can enhance competitiveness by lowering real 
total costs per litre. The finding that dairy trading income contributed significantly to the 
overall profitability of the dairy enterprise was important as during times of relatively low 
milk prices, milk producers generally can fall back on the ‘beef’ value of their cull cows to 
survive in the short-term. Specialisation in milk production was not a statistically 
significant determinant of the long-term competitiveness of EG milk producers. A possible 
reason is that relative to other countries, SA milk producers face higher financial risk and, 
therefore, have an incentive to adopt appropriate risk-management strategies. With regard 
to the 11 EG milk producers, relatively large farm sizes may encourage enterprise 
diversification and, therefore, complete specialisation in milk production may be less likely 
in EG. Of course, the decision to diversify or specialise in the long-term depends on the 







The level of farm debt was found to be an important financial factor influencing the long-
term competitiveness of milk producers in EG. With an increase in indebtedness comes an 
obligation to pay higher levels of interest (and principal) which may reduce 
competitiveness. The importance of debt in the context of milk production in EG may be 
overstated, however, due to the use of the overall farm business debt-to-asset ratio in the 
Ridge regression model.  Milk production per cow, a proxy for managerial ability in 
previous studies, was a statistically significant determinant of the long-term 
competitiveness of EG milk producers. Technological change over the study period, such 
as improvements in AI practice, parlour design and irrigation methods, also influence 
competitiveness of EG milk producers in the long-term. These producers have responded 
to policy and technological changes over the study period by increasing dairy herd size, 
substituting pasture for purchased feed, and many have used cross-breeding to increase 







CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study used two competitiveness analyses to investigate the changes in, and factors 
affecting, the long-term competitiveness of a group of commercial milk producers from 
East Griqualand (EG). Competitiveness in this study is defined as the ability of a milk 
producer to achieve sustainable business growth while earning at least the opportunity cost 
of management. Using a microeconomic method of competitiveness analysis, the Unit Cost 
Ratio (UCR) method, the study, firstly, investigated the impact of deregulation on the 
competitiveness of sample EG milk producers over the period 1983 to 2006.  
 
The UCR analysis suggested that sample EG milk producers were not competitive based 
on the local price received for milk over the study period but relative competitiveness 
improved when dairy cattle trading income was included. This suggests that trading 
income plays an important role in contributing to the overall competitiveness of the sample 
EG dairy enterprise. The UCR analysis also showed that over the study period, during 
which the dairy industry was gradually deregulated, sample EG milk producers generally 
responded to declining real producer prices by reducing real costs of milk production per 
litre. Reductions in real total costs per litre may have been facilitated by: (1) expansion of 
dairy enterprise size, (2) the shift from high to low cost production systems (such as 
pasture systems), and (3) technological improvements over the study period.  
 
The response by sample EG milk producers to deregulation is consistent with evidence 
from national milk producer trends which indicate that the number of SA commercial milk 
producers has declined while milk output per producer has increased. Although sample EG 
producers were not competitive based on the local price received for milk, they were more 
competitive relative to the average SA milk producer as sample EG producers received 
higher local prices than the national average over the study period. There was also a 
statistically significant difference in the effects of, and response to, deregulation by 
producers in the top- and bottom-one third of the EG study group milk producers. 
Producers in the top one-third category, generally, received higher product prices and 
produced milk at lower real cost than producers in the bottom one-third category. Real cost 
advantages may have been due to the use of superior/cost-reducing technologies and/or 







(institutional) changes in the SA dairy industry and changes in the relative competitiveness 
of a panel of milk producers from EG exists, it is difficult to attribute changes in relative 
competitiveness exclusively to institutional change. Based on the findings of the UCR 
analysis a further investigation into other factors influencing the competitiveness of EG 
milk producers was needed.  
 
The second competitiveness analysis used Ridge regression to investigate factors 
influencing the competitiveness of 11 selected commercial EG milk producers for the 
period 1990 to 2006. The results of this analysis found that size of the dairy enterprise, the 
level of farm debt relative to assets, production per cow, technological and policy changes, 
and the ratio of trading income to total milk income influenced the long-term 
competitiveness of these sample EG milk producers. The findings were consistent with 
those of other international studies on factors affecting the profitability of a dairy 
enterprise.  
 
The importance of dairy herd size suggests that economies of size exist on the sample of 
EG dairy farms. While the ratio of pasture and forage costs to total feed costs was not a 
statistically significant determinant of the long-term competitiveness of sample EG milk 
producers over the study period (due possibly to a lack of variation in this variable), 
pasture-based systems can enhance competitiveness by lowering real total costs per litre. 
The finding that dairy trading income contributed significantly to the overall profitability 
of the EG dairy enterprise was important as during times of relatively low milk prices, milk 
producers can fall back on the slaughter value of their cull cows to survive in the short-run. 
Contrary to the findings in other studies, specialisation in milk production was found not to 
be a statistically significant determinant of the long-term competitiveness of sample EG 
milk producers in this analysis. A possible reason for this is that, relative to milk producers 
in other countries, SA milk producers face higher costs of production and interest rates 
and, therefore, are subject to greater risk. Diversification is a commonly practiced risk 
management strategy for sample EG milk producers due to relatively large farm sizes and, 
therefore, complete specialisation in milk production is unlikely. This variable may also 
have lacked variation.   
 
The level of farm debt relative to assets was found to be an important financial factor 







increase in indebtedness comes an obligation to pay higher levels of interest (and principal) 
which reduces competitiveness. The importance of debt in the context of sample EG milk 
producers may be overstated, however, due to the use of the overall farm business debt-to-
asset ratio.  Milk production per cow, a proxy for managerial ability in previous studies, 
was a statistically significant determinant of long-term competitiveness for the selected EG 
milk producers. Technological change over the study period, such as improvements in herd 
genetics and AI practice, parlour design and irrigation methods, also influence 
competitiveness of sample EG milk producers in the long-term. The response to policy 
change, captured by a proxy (trend) variable, was also shown to positively influence the 
competitiveness of EG milk producers in the long-term. To enhance competitiveness in a 
deregulated environment, profitable sample EG milk producers should consider increasing 
their dairy herd sizes, utilise more pasture and forage based production systems and select 
dairy cattle of superior genetic merit that produce high milk yields on pasture. The 
availability of sufficient data prior to 1990 was a particular problem in this analysis. 
Missing values for the 1990 to 2006 study period were accounted for using MI and MCMC 
methods and these were shown to be viable methods of accounting for the missing 
observations in the sample of EG milk producers. 
 
The study results can also be used to assess the perception amongst many SA milk 
producers that the current marketing arrangements for milk, following dairy market 
deregulation, have negatively affected the profitability of their dairy enterprises. From the 
findings of previous research and of this study, the net effect of deregulation over the study 
period on the profitability and competitiveness of sample EG milk producers manifests 
itself in the response of these producers to that change. Therefore, the impact of policy 
reforms on agricultural producers should not merely be assessed in terms of positive and 
negative effects on producers, but should also be assessed in terms of the production and 
management responses by producers in the long-term. Milk producers in the EG sample 
have, generally, responded to reduced real milk prices, following deregulation, by 
increasing dairy herd size, substituting pastures and forages for purchased feed, and many 
use cross-breeding to optimise milk output per unit area rather than production per 
livestock unit. The statistically significant differences between milk producers in the top 
and bottom one-third categories of the panel group suggest that, ceteris paribus, producers 
in the top one-third category are more profitable because they have been better able to deal 








Policy recommendations that can be made, based on the findings of this study, are that the 
SA government should continue contributing funding towards research and development, 
veterinary services and to the maintenance of adequate milk quality standards in the dairy 
industry. Pitfalls of government intervention in agriculture have been well documented and 
findings in this study support proportional reward for efficient and competitive agricultural 
producers and the competitive market process which exposes inefficiencies. However, 
increased imports of milk and other dairy products from countries subsiding exports could 
pose a threat to domestic milk producers and government should, therefore, review its 
tariff policy for imported milk and dairy products as South Africa has one of the world’s 
lowest tariff rates for milk and dairy products.  
 
Since dairy market deregulation, SA and sample EG milk producers face numerous 
challenges such as fluctuating producer and input prices, increased imports, land reform, 
the introduction of land taxes and the possible passing of a land expropriation act. These 
challenges necessitate that SA milk producers, generally, need to become more perceptive 
and responsive to future economic and policy changes by adapting their management styles 
and production systems. More effective collaboration between producers and other 
stakeholders in the dairy supply chain is one strategy that producers may adopt to increase 
their bargaining power in the dairy marketplace. 
 
The development of South Africa’s emerging milk producers also needs consideration and 
it should be recognised that the needs of these producers differ from those of large 
commercial milk producers. For example, emerging milk producers often lack the capital 
resources and practical and financial management expertise required to become successful 
milk producers.  To aid in developing a viable emerging milk producer sector, government 
and other role-players in the SA dairy industry, such as the Department of Agriculture 
(DOA) and the Milk Producer’s Organisation (MPO), should consider providing the 
necessary capital, extension and training to emerging milk producers. Policymakers should 
also note, however, that the development of successful emerging milk producers under 
challenging circumstances is a long-term process and, therefore, a long-term planning 








This study addressed some gaps in previous local research on the impacts of deregulation 
in the SA dairy industry, with particular regard to the industry’s primary sector. Study 
results can also be used by milk producers, consultants advising milk producers, 
organisations such as the MPO, the NAMC and the DOA to better understand the 
determinants of long-term profitability and competitiveness at the producer level. The SA 
dairy industry’s important role-players, both private and government, should address the 
need for greater research into the industry and, in particular, the industry’s primary sector. 
Relevant aggregate and detailed milk producer data are currently not available and this 
should be rectified by the SA milk industry to promote further research in the industry. 
Funds for future research could possibly be raised from a small levy payable by milk 
producers to an organisation such as the MPO who could direct funds to researchers.  
 
Areas for further research include extending the analysis to investigate the determinants of 
milk producer competitiveness in other major milk producing regions such the Eastern 
Cape and Western Cape. The inclusion of human capital and management factors (such as 
age, education and experience) may also add value to future research. These factors were 
omitted in this study due to the length of the study period as it was assumed that milk 
producers would not be able give reliable estimates of decisions they made more than 10 
years ago. Further analysis should also investigate the specific management responses to 
an institutional change over time so that a better understanding of how market deregulation 
affects management responses can be gained. It is also important to understand what 
management strategies agricultural producers adopt to manage the challenges brought 
about by institutional change so that policymakers and other role-players are informed 











Government intervention in the SA dairy industry (and in agriculture as a whole) began 
amid turbulent and difficult economic conditions in the early 20
th
 century. Proponents of 
control argued that the unique production and marketing features of milk and dairy 
products necessitated regulation and control in the dairy industry. Restrictions on the 
competitive market process in the SA dairy industry, imposed by regulation under the 
Marketing Acts of 1937 (Act 27 of 1937) and 1968 (Act 59 of 1968), altered the 
competitive dynamics of the SA dairy industry, resulting in higher prices to consumers, the 
development and proliferation of an oligopsonisitc market structure, and a largely 
inefficient primary sector (producing at a relatively high cost). Failing to meet its 
objectives, the Marketing Act of 1968 (Act 59 of 1968) was abolished in 1996 and a new 
Act, the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 (Act 47 of 1996), was 
promulgated. Although deregulation of the dairy industry was initiated in 1971 the process 
was officially completed with the promulgation of the new Act in 1996. Previous local 
research found that the effects of deregulation on SA milk producers included reduced 
profit margins, loss of market share for fresh milk and other dairy products, expansion and 
consolidation of SA dairy farms, and a shift in milk production from inland to coastal 
regions. Associated with deregulation, however, was also some evidence of an 
improvement in the technical efficiency of the primary sector in KZN.  
 
For the purposes of this study, individual milk producer data were collected from the East 
Griqualand (EG) milk producer study group for the period 1983 to 2006. Data collected 
comprised detailed production and financial records for each milk producer member of the 
study group. The EG study group was established in 1983 and its objective is to improve 
the production and financial performance of its members. The current size of the study 
group is 23 commercial milk producers. East Griqualand is located on the eastern seaboard 
of South Africa and is characterised by relatively high summer rainfall and sourveld 
grazing conditions. Milk production systems in EG are predominantly pasture-based with 
varying rates of purchased feed (concentrates) also utilised.  
 
Based on a definition by Esterhuizen (2006:89), competitiveness in this study is defined as 







the opportunity cost of management. Thus, a producer is competitive if positive land rents 
(returns to land) are earned. A microeconomic indicator of competitiveness, the Unit Cost 
Ratio (UCR), developed by Siggel and Cockburn (1995), is used to measure the long-term 
competitiveness of EG milk producers. The Unit Cost Ratio is defined as the ratio of total 
dairy enterprise costs (accounting costs plus an opportunity cost of management calculated 
at 5% of milk income) to total dairy enterprise income. This ratio can also be considered as 
a measure of enterprise profitability. 
 
The objectives of this study were, firstly, using a UCR analysis, to investigate the impact 
of dairy market deregulation on the competitiveness of the group of EG commercial milk 
producers over the period 1983 to 2006. Based on the findings of the UCR analysis, a 
second study objective was to investigate the influence of other important factors on 
competitiveness of a panel of selected commercial EG milk producers over the period 1990 
to 2006 using Ridge regression. Ridge regression was used due to multicollinearity 
between the explanatory variables. Eleven milk producers were selected on the basis of the 
completeness of their financial and production records in this analysis.  
 
The first UCR analysis found that, based on the local price received for milk, EG milk 
producers were not competitive over the period 1983 to 2006. When dairy cattle trading 
income was included, however, relative competitiveness improved. This suggests that 
trading income has been an important contributor to the profitability of EG dairy 
enterprises over the study period. The role of trading income is emphasised during times of 
relatively low local milk prices. Had EG milk producers received the national milk price, 
their dairy enterprises would not have been competitive from 1983 to 2002. This suggests 
that EG milk producers, on average, received higher milk prices than the national average 
price over the study period. The results of the UCR analysis indicated that further analysis 
be undertaken to investigate other factors influencing the competitiveness of EG milk 
producers. 
 
Using Ridge regression, the second analysis investigated factors influencing the 
competitiveness of a panel of 11 EG milk producers for the period 1990 to 2006. The total 
sample size was 187 (11 producers x 17 years). Ten observations were missing, however, 







methods. Using the UCR scores for each producer-year (UCRit) as the dependent variable, 
other variables included in the regression analysis were: the natural logarithm of herd 
(farm) size (LNCOWSit), the ratio of pasture and forage costs to total feed costs 
(PASCOSTit), the ratio of dairy cattle trading income to total milk income (TRADINCit), 
the ratio of milk income to gross farm income (SPECIALISEit), annual milk production per 
cow (PRODCOWit), a proxy (trend) variable capturing policy, technological and other 
changes over the study period (YEARit), and the debt-to-asset ratio, a measure of farm 
solvency (DEBTASSETit). 
The results of this analysis showed that the size of dairy enterprise, the debt level of the 
farm business, production per cow, technological and policy changes, and the ratio of 
trading income to total milk income influence the long-term competitiveness of the 
selected EG milk producers. Recommendations to EG milk producers to enhance 
competitiveness in a deregulated dairy market were also made. Small (relative to the base 
category producer), profitable EG milk producers should consider expanding their herd 
size to capture the benefits of size economies as the importance of herd size to the overall 
profitability (competitiveness) of EG dairy enterprises suggests that size economies exist. 
Milk producers in EG should also consider utilising more pasture and forage based 
production systems (to lower production costs) and to select dairy cattle of superior genetic 
merit that produce high milk yields on pasture. Trading income will continue to play an 
important role in determining the overall profitability of the dairy enterprise. 
A number of conclusions were drawn from the study. Based on the findings of previous 
research and this study, government should continue to assist in providing support to and 
funding for dairy research and development, veterinary services and regulations for the 
maintenance of milk quality. The study also recommends that government consider raising 
tariff levels for milk and other dairy products to protect South Africa’s milk producers 
from imports derived from countries whose exports are subsidised. Although SA milk 
producers face many challenges, the perception that dairy market deregulation has 
impacted negatively on the profitability of their enterprises is disputed by the findings of 
this study. These challenges, amongst other things, necessitate better management and 
responsiveness to changes on the part of South Africa’s milk producers. With regard to 
emerging milk producers, they face reduced profit margins (diseconomies of size) and 







horizon in order to effectively develop emerging milk producers. Role-players in the SA 
dairy industry should also consider providing funds for future research into the industry’s 
primary sector. Investigating the impact of dairy market deregulation on, and determinants 
of, competitiveness for milk producers in other regions of South Africa, and including its 
effect on human capital and management factors and management responses, are areas 
which warrant further research.  
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Producer price calculation for a typical commercial milk producer in East 
Griqualand, South Africa. 
 
The determination of producer prices for fresh milk post-deregulation is a complex matter 
and varies considerably between producers. Subsequent to dairy market deregulation, it is 
the responsibility of the respective milk buyers to determine the producer price and this is 
often based on quality and quantity attributes (comparative base-pricing system). As an 
incentive for the production of high quality milk, milk buyers generally offer price 
premiums for butterfat and protein concentration. An outline of the producer price 
determination scheme for a large milk buyer in 2007 for a typical milk producer in East 
Griqualand is presented below: 
 
Butterfat average             : 3.84% = 63.28c/litre 
Protein                              : 3.50% = 54.27c/litre 
Volume                             : 122.5 c/litre 
Somatic cell count            : 400000 = 0c/litre 
Collection cost                  : 11.37c/litre (based on volume/distance calculation) 
Production stimulation     : 15c/litre 
Full delivery supply          : 10c/litre 
 
Total price received by producer =  256.80c/litre 
 
















EAST GRIQUALAND DAIRY PRODUCER QUESTIONNAIRE: MAY 
2008 
 
Farmer’s Name*: _______________________________ 
 
1. If you had to hire a suitably-qualified manager to manage your farm on your behalf, 
what would the annual cost (including benefits) of such a manager be? 
R____________________ 
 
2. If you had to look for employment off the farm, what do you estimate your annual 
remuneration (including benefits) would be in your next best line of work? 
R____________________ 
 
3. What probability would you give to actually being able to get such a job (e.g., there 
could be a 70% chance of getting the job)? ______________% 
 
4. If you have a mixed farm, what proportion of your overall management time is 
spent on your dairy enterprise (including the associated activities such as pasture 
management, feed mixing and office work)? _____________% 
 
 
*Required to match the answers in the questionnaire to your production data. This 
information will not be published. 
 
















Table C1: Average real net local milk prices (PL) and average real total costs per litre 
of the top and bottom one-third of East Griqualand milk producers, 1983 – 2006 
(2000 = 100). 
 Top one-third Bottom one-third  














1983 – 1987 2.01 1.99 1.77 1.97 1.66 
1988 – 1992 1.60 1.78 1.58 2.02 1.35 
1993 – 1997 1.56 1.57 1.38 1.77 1.23 
1998 – 2002 1.34 1.31 1.30 1.53 1.28 
2003 – 2006 1.57 1.39 1.49 1.69 1.52 
* include an opportunity cost of management 
 
Restricted F test 
 
F = (RsquaredUR – RsquaredR)/m          




RsquaredUR = 0.53 
RsquaredR     = 0.29 
m              = 10 
n               = 177 
k               = 18 
 
Critical F value for 10 numerator degrees of freedom and 159 denominator degrees of 
freedom = 2.41 at 1% level of significance. Therefore the hypothesis that the intercepts for 
each milk producer are the same is rejected. There seem to be strong individual effects and 
statistically significant differences amongst the sample EG milk producers.  








Table D1: Results of fixed effects Ridge regression model for a panel of EG milk 
producers with missing data, 1990 – 2006 (n=177) 
Parameter β-coefficient Standardised 
coefficient 
Std error t - statistic 
LNCOWS -0.0346 -0.186 5.25×10
-3 
-6.59*** 
PASCOST -0.0270 -0.0442 0.0191 -1.41 
TRADINC -0.196
 























   
     
Base category 1.230  0.0390 31.5*** 
D2 -0.0233 -0.0615 0.0108 -2.16** 
D3 -0.0380 -0.100 0.0113 -3.36*** 
D4 0.0276 0.0729 0.0111 2.49** 
D5 0.0120
 
0.0317 0.0113 1.06 
D6 0.0146
 






D8 0.0570 0.150 0.0108 5.28*** 
D9 -0.0276 -0.0729 0.0116 -2.38** 









 = 0.61  Adjusted  R
2
 = 0.54 df = 159 
F- statistic = 14.5***  d = 1.77 
Note: **,*** denote significance at the  5% and 1% levels, respectively 
LNCOWS       = natural logarithm of number of cows 
PASCOST       = ratio of pasture and forage costs to total feed costs 
TRADINC       = ratio of trading income to total milk income 
SPECIALISE   = ratio of milk income to gross farm income 
PRODCOW     = production per cow  
DEBTASSET  = debt/asset ratio 
YEAR              = Trend variable 
D2...D11            = Differential intercept dummy variables. 
 
